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AN INTENTIONAL TORT THEORY OF PATENTS

Saurabh Vishnubhakat
Abstract
This Article challenges the dogma of U.S. patent law that direct
infringement is a strict liability tort. Impermissibly practicing a patented
invention does create liability even if the infringer did not intend to
infringe or know about the patent. The consensus is that this is a form of
strict liability. The flaw in the consensus is that it proves too little, for the
same is true of intentional torts: intent to commit the tort is unnecessary,
and ignorance of the legal right is no excuse. What is relevant is intent to
perform the action that the law deems tortious. So for the tort of patent
infringement, the question is whether liability should require that the
infringer intended to perform the actions that constitute infringement. The
patent statute and the few cases that have broached the question suggest
the answer is yes-tortious intent should be necessary. However, patent
law currently takes no position on tortious intent. The strict liability view
is merely a default. This Article fills that gap by applying ordinary tort
principles to patent infringement. The proposed framework offers a
powerful policy lever for important issues implicating the notice function
of patents, including divided infringement, claim construction, and
inherency. This framework also mitigates the effects of patent assertion
on risk allocation in the patent system by differentiating among makers,
sellers, and users of patented innovation-a distinction that is
economically important but has no principled basis in patent doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION

It is conventional wisdom in patent law that direct infringement is a
strict liability tort.' A patent creates a right to exclude others from
making, selling, or using the patented invention. 2 Performing any of these
activities-practicing the patented invention-without the patent
owner's permission is direct infringement of the patent.3 Infringing in this
way creates liability even if the infringer did not intend to commit
infringement or even know of the patent.4 If the infringer did intend to
infringe or did know of the patent, then enhanced damages may be
available for willful infringement.5 But the underlying direct
infringement requires neither. 6 These are the basic precepts of patent
infringement. By the consensus view of patent law, these precepts amount
to strict liability.7
This consensus view is an unfortunate caricature of strict liability.
Indeed, these precepts would be just as true if direct infringement were
an intentional tort. Intentional torts, too, do not require intent to commit
a tort or any knowledge that a legal right exists.8 What is relevant is the
tortfeasor's intent to perform an act that the law deems tortious. 9 If direct
infringement were an intentional tort, an infringer could still be liable
without intending to infringe the patent and without knowing that the
patent exists, so long as she intended to perform one of the actions that
constitute infringement: making, selling, or using the patented invention.
So, is patent infringement a strict liability tort, as patent law currently
contends, or an intentional tort, which is just as plausible under the basic
precepts of infringement? To decide, patent law must answer an
1. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) ("Infringement ... is a strict liability offense."), rev'don other grounds, 520 U.S. 17,
34-35 (1997).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2012). The patent owner may also exclude others from offering the
invention for sale or from importing the invention into the United States. Id As a shorthand, this
Article refers to "making, selling, and using," except when analyzing the statutory text itself. See
infra Subsection II.B.1.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
4. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that patent
infringement's so-called strict liability character obliges courts to grant relief "regardless of the
intent, culpability or motivation of the infringer").
5. Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977, 986 (D. Del. 1982).
6. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1527.
7. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, ContributoryInfringement/PatentMisuse: Metaphysics and
Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 87 (1982) (referring to direct infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) as a strict liability tort).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
9. Id ("The word 'intent' is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that
the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.").
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important doctrinal question: should direct infringement liability require
that the alleged infringer intended to perform the actions that constitute
infringement?
If the answer is yes, then direct infringement is an intentional tort, but
only in the ordinary sense that unintended actions cannot form the basis
for liability. In fact, the patent statute supports this reading, as do the few
judicial opinions that have implicitly addressed it. Those opinions found
non-infringement because there was no tortious intent to perform the
actions that infringed.1 0 This reasoning indicates that tortious intent is,
indeed, necessary. However, if the answer is no, then even unintended
actions can form the basis for direct infringement liability. Such a regime
would be purely distributive, allocating cost and risk to the public without
any respect for autonomy, personal agency, or purposive action.
Nevertheless, though infringement doctrine routinely refers to strict
liability, patent law does not currently say that the answer to the doctrinal
question is no. Until now, patent law has ignored the question altogether.
The consensus is nothing more than a default.
The effects of this analytical gap are profound. By failing to answer
the necessary doctrinal question about intended actions, while
uncritically repeating the rhetoric of strict liability, patent law always
risks drifting toward the latter, distributive regime of direct infringement.
In that world, adequate public notice about the existence and boundaries
of patent rights is essential to justifying the patent system, but virtually
impossible to achieve. If someone may become liable for infringing a
patent without any general or specific intent to perform the relevant
actions, then the public bears all the cost and risk of avoiding actions that
may turn out to infringe. As a result, the patent system must make
abundantly clear ex ante the existence and scope of patent rights. The
most forceful evidence of patent failure is notice failure, particularly
where it benefits so-called patent trolls who trade on information
asymmetries and ambiguities about the scope of patent rights. But if that
world is largely the one in which we already live, it is not because patent
law has broadly made the wrong normative choice about whether
infringement should require intended actions. It is because patent law has
failed to choose.
The purpose of this Article is to raise that question and to answer yes.
Direct infringement liability should require an underlying intent to make,
sell, or use the patented invention-intent to perform the actions that
constitute the tort of direct patent infringement. To clarify, this is simply
tortious intent to perform certain actions, not the altogether different
intent to commit infringement, which patent law separately penalizes
10. See, e.g., Brothers v. United States, 52 Ct. Cl. 462, 467 (1917).
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under the remedial doctrine of willful infringement and which would
remain unnecessary for liability." Patent law's ignorance of this
distinction has created a number of normative problems by default.1 2 If,
upon asking the question about intended actions, patent law now chooses
to disregard the relevant intent behind actions that constitute
infringement, then those normative problems will only become
formalized and worsen.
A first problem with disregarding tortious intent is that there is no
principled basis for differentiating among different kinds of actors in the
patent system based on their actions. This distinction is economically
significant because the kinds of actions that can give rise to infringement
occupy very different positions in the stream of commerce. 13 Such actions
also reflect divergent calculations of cost, risk, and reward. As a result,
makers, sellers, and users all have their own distinct approaches to
conducting patent searches and clearances, avoiding infringement, and
even forgoing economically productive activity in some cases.
For example, a complex and highly integrated product such as a tablet
computer presents very different infringement risks for the various actors
who cross paths with a single patented component of the tablet, such as a
piece of storage hardware. The manufacturer of the component is likely
to have considerable knowledge about its design and operation. As a
result, the manufacturer's act of making the component is likely to be
intentional, even if the manufacturer is unaware of any relevant patents.
By contrast, the downstream retailer of the fully manufactured tablet is
less likely to know about the particular storage component when selling
the tablet. As a result, the retailer's act of selling the tablet is less likely
to be intentional with respect to the component. And the end purchaser,
concerned broadly with the tablet and likely ignorant of its inner
workings, is probably the most poorly positioned to act with tortious
intent as to the component when using the tablet. To sum up these
differences, the manufacturer has the lowest information cost for
avoiding infringement; the end user, the highest cost. It is therefore
unsound policy to treat all of these actors as interchangeable potential
infringers. However, differentiating among them necessarily means
taking account of their various incentives to perform particular kinds of
11. Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977, 986 (D. Del. 1982).
12. A broader set of critiques is also emerging around the incoherent roles of tortious intent
in copyright infringement and trademark infringement, with calls for greater analytical precision
about the tort theory underlying these doctrines. See, e.g., Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright
Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 352-53 (2015); David
Welkowitz, Fault Lines in Trademark Default Judgments, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 101, 107-08

(2014).
13. See infra Section III.B.
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actions that may infringe. The doctrine of tortious intent resolves that
analytical problem, 14 particularly for the prominent policy challenge of
managing end user liability.' 5
A second problem with disregarding tortious intent is that it
indiscriminately imposes infringement liability on actions that are purely
inadvertent or even unforeseeable, such as unexpectedly producing trace
amounts of a chemical that happens to be patented in an otherwise
permissible industrial process. 16 Importantly, shielding inadvertent
actions is a different question from that of shielding inadvertent
infringement, which refers more broadly to all actions (whether
intentional or not) that take place in ignorance of others' patent rights.
For example, one type of inadvertent infringement may be for a firm
to carry out an industrial process designed to produce Chemical A but
which unexpectedly produces a different Chemical B that, unbeknownst
to the firm, turns out to be patented. Another type of inadvertent
infringement may be for the firm deliberately to perform a method of
measuring drug levels in the bloodstreams of patients and adjusting drug
dosage accordingly, a method that unwittingly turns out to infringe a
patent. In the former example, the act of producing Chemical B is
inadvertent because the infringing compound was not an intended
product of the process. The infringement is also inadvertent because the
firm was unaware of the patent. In the latter example, the actions of
measuring drug levels and adjusting dosage are intentional, and only the
infringement is inadvertent. Some scholars, agencies, and legislators
support immunizing even the latter, broader set where only the
infringement is inadvertent. There is, therefore, at least as much support
for immunizing actions that are purely inadvertent. Yet such immunity
necessarily means asking whether the actor intended to commit such
tortious actions. The doctrine of tortious intent also resolves this
analytical problem of inadvertence, one that is especially pressing after
problematic judicial precedents regarding the inherency doctrine.' 7
A third problem with disregarding tortious intent is that it aggravates
the systemic challenge of divided infringement, which arises when
separate actions of multiple parties collectively infringe a patent. The
U.S. Supreme Court faced the issue during the October 2013 Term in
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc." after the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit produced a fractured en banc
14. See infra Section III.A.
15. See infra Subsection III.B.3.

16. Eg., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
17. See infra Section III.C.
18. 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
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decision.1 9 However, the Court's opinion left open the fundamental
question of how to decide whether to consider the conduct of multiple
accused parties collectively. 2 0 Without a principled basis for making this
decision, courts necessarily risk crafting an error-prone rule. If the rule is
over-inclusive, it will impose liability on wholly unrelated actors
practicing freely available inventions.21 If the rule is under-inclusive, it
will condone the violation of patent rights through strategically divided
actions among parties acting deliberately in concert. 2 2 The doctrine of
tortious intent resolves this dilemma and offers the only principled way
to do so. 2 3
A fourth problem is claim construction, which underlies all legal and
factual conclusions of patent validity as well as the risk and actual
occurrence of infringement. Claim construction poses a number of
subsidiary questions, including how to construe claims in the first place,
how horizontally to address prior constructions among district courts and
administrative tribunals, and how vertically to address on appeal the
constructions of lower courts. These questions reflect policy concerns
about understanding patent boundaries accurately and precisely as well
as about allocating decision-making authority between trial and appellate
courts and between judicial and administrative institutions. Prominent
among these concerns is the propriety of the purposive approach to claim
construction. Purposive construction derives meaning from the patent
text based on the purposes for which the patent was constituted, namely
to protect the inventor's invention. 2 4 The approach remains controversial,
and even courts that engage in it do not always do so transparently. The
doctrine of tortious intent is consonant with purposive construction and
offers a coherent justification for it.2 5
In sum, this Article fills the analytical gap in direct patent
infringement through the doctrine of tortious intent. Application of the
doctrine proceeds from ordinary tort principles, the text of the Patent Act
itself, and the few patent decisions that have examined intent to perform
actions relevant to infringement. The result is a powerful new policy lever
in current debates about patent notice and the effect of patent litigation
on static and dynamic efficiency in the patent system.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I shows that the current view
of patent infringement as a strict liability tort reflects a misunderstanding
19. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
20. Id. at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting).
21. See infra Section Ill.A.
22. See infra Section Ill.A.
23. See infra Section Ill.A.
24. See infra Subsection Ill.E.2.
25. See infra Subsection IlIl.E.2.
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of tort law principles and discusses the normative implications of this
mistake. Part I derives a theory of tortious intent based on a
correspondence between the extent of a tortfeasor's liability and the level
of purposive action involved in her commission of the tort. Part III applies
this theory to direct infringement, explains how requiring tortious intent
for direct infringement liability is analytically consonant with other
patent law doctrines, and discusses four major policy benefits that the
doctrine of tortious intent offers for patent notice and abusive patent
litigation.
I. PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS A STRICT LIABILITY TORT
As for the basic act of direct infringement, there is a widespread view
that patent law, when imposing liability, takes no account of intent to
infringe the patent or of knowledge that the patent even exists. 26 These
facts are relevant only to identify indirect forms of infringement or to
determine the appropriate remedy. Accordingly, commentators and even
courts routinely refer to direct patent infringement as a strict liability
offense.2 7
A. The CentralDogma
This practice of referring to strict liability as the doctrinal baseline of
infringement while sometimes departing from strict liability does not
survive closer scrutiny. Evaluating recent Supreme Court case law
reveals the conceptual incoherence of the strict liability dogma and
invites a more careful look at what strict liability would actually mean.
1. The Strict Liability View in Patent Law
Historically, the disregard for intent to infringe and for knowledge of
the patent has long been a rule of U.S. patent infringement law, with cases
as early as the 1840s taking as given that one "may have infringed without
intending, or even knowing it; but he is not, on that account, the less an
infringer." 2 8 By the time Professor Albert Walker first published his 1883
treatise on patent law, it was well established that infringement required
neither knowledge of the patent nor appreciation that one's act constituted
infringement.2 9 Subsequent editions affirmed this understanding and
26. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
27. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), rev'don other grounds, 520 U.S. 17, 34-35 (1997).
28. Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1143 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740); see also
Parker v. Haworth, 18 F. Cas. 1135, 1136 (C.C.D. Ill. 1848) (No. 10,738) (instructing that "[tlhe
defendant may not have been aware of the plaintiffs right").
29. ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

§ 377 (1st ed. 1883).
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further clarified that independent invention without any knowledge of an
existing patent did not avert infringement. 30 However, as early as
Professor William Robinson's 1890 treatise, the general body of law
disregarding infringer intent already included an exception for what
would later become the doctrine of contributory infringement:
But there are many actions, equivocal in character so far as
the external operation is concerned, which are or are not acts
of infringement according to the object contemplated by
their actor,-actions otherwise innocent thus being regarded
as violations of the rights secured by the patent, when
intended as parts of a transaction which taken as a whole
would be an infringement.3 1
Professor Robinson discussed these equivocal actions-infringement
by unlawful making, unlawful using, and unlawful selling-as part of a
unitary doctrine for capturing direct and contributory infringers, 32 and
therefore asserted a role for intent that "has not been borne out by
subsequent developments." 33 For example, his discussion of infringement
by unlawful making contemplates distinctions between making as a
construction and making as a repair, 34 a distinction whose current form
does not consider the infringer's intent at all.35 His discussion also
contemplates permissible makings for experimental purposes, though the
experimental use exception is widely regarded as all but a dead letter, 36
particularly after the Federal Circuit's decision in Madey v. Duke
University.37 Nevertheless, Professor Robinson's evaluation of allegedly
infringing actions based on "the object contemplated by their actor" is not
wholly misplaced, as it reflects an intuitive distinction between intending
to infringe and intending to perform actions that constitute infringement,
a distinction as meaningful as it is overlooked.3 8

30. See 3 ANTHONY W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS: DELLER'S EDITION

§

453 (1937);

§ 377
§ 433

(5th ed. 1917);
ALBERT H. WALKER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS
(6th ed. 1929).
31. 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 901 (1890).
ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS

32. See id

§§ 903-06.

33. 4 R. CARL Moy, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 14:17 (Westlaw 4th ed. 2015).
34. 3 ROBINSON, supra note 31, § 903.
35. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105-06 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(discussing the repair-reconstruction dichotomy).
36. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuitof Genetic Information, 65 ALA.

L. REV. 625, 678 (2014).
37. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that use is not experimental if it is "in
keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged infringer"); see also Kumar, supra note 36, at
678-79 (arguing for a statutory research exemption after the Madey decision).
38. See infra Subsection I.A.3.
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Apart from the general acceptance that intent is irrelevant to direct
infringement, the designation of this principle as a form of strict liability
is also widespread, though not as long-established. This vocabulary of
strict liability pervades the scholarly discussion of both patent
infringement 39 and analogous infringements of other intellectual property
rights. 4 0 In the face of this literature framing patent infringement as a
strict liability tort, courts in the last twenty years have followed suit. 4 1
The Federal Circuit has even elaborated further, discussing strict liability
not only as a characterization to be inferred from the historical disregard
for both intent to infringe and knowledge of the patent, but also as a
premise to guide both the infringement analysis itself4 2 and the resolution
of related issues such as evidentiary relevance. 4 3
2. Departures from Strict Liability in Patent Law
Still, despite this adherence to a strict liability conception of direct
patent infringement, not all violations of patent rights give rise to strict
liability, and the strict liability designation carries caveats in the
literature. Willful infringement, induced infringement, and contributory
infringement all require some level of purposive action, such as
39. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 7, at 87.
40. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and
Technological Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47, 52 n.29 (1989) (arguing that direct
infringement incurs strict liability not only for patents but also for trademarks and copyrights);
Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 ARIz.

L. REV. 347,381 n. 162 (1983) (comparing a potential strict liability rule for innocent unauthorized
use of trade secrets with the accepted strict liability rule of action for direct patent infringement
under

§ 271(a)). Notably,

independent creation is a defense to infringement in copyright and trade

secrecy, necessarily moderating the practical reach of any discussion regarding infringer intent.
Id.

41. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (noting, with respect to the doctrine of equivalents, that "[i]nfringement is, and should
remain, a strict liability offense"), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17, 34-35 (1997) (accepting
the Federal Circuit's intent-neutral view of infringement-notably, without using the language of

strict liability).
42. See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that
patent infringement's so-called strict liability character obliges courts to grant relief "regardless
of the intent, culpability or motivation of the infringer").

43. See, e.g., Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 256 F.R.D. 229, 232 (D.D.C. 2009). In pertinent
part, the court in Intervet held that a disputed interrogatory was relevant and therefore

discoverable. Id. The interrogatory inquired about the circumstances under which the alleged
infringer became aware of the patent-in-suit. Id. at 231. The court recognized that information is
relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 if "it is likely to make a material fact more or less
likely," and awareness of the patent could be material or not depending on whether the patentee

had alleged direct infringement alone (immaterial) or something more, requiring knowledge of
the patent or intent to infringe (material). Id. at 232. Notably, the court expressly invoked the
"strict liability" view of direct infringement. Id
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recklessness or actual intent, or some level of knowledge such as
constructive or actual notice that the patent exists and is infringed.4 4 Yet
even these modest departures 'only underscore the more fundamental
mistake of regarding the basic act of direct infringement a strict liability
tort.
Liability for willful infringement arises only where an infringer acts
recklessly, that is, "despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent." 45 Proceeding recklessly in this
manner does not itself create infringement liability-that threshold issue
is still regarded as one of strict liability-but may warrant the imposition
of enhanced damages up to threefold what the judge or jury assesses
under 35 U.S.C. § 284.46 Seagate overruled the previous willful
infringement standard set forth in UnderwaterDevices Inc. v. MorrisonKnudsen Co.47 that a potential infringer with "actual notice of another's
patent rights ... has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing." 48 The effect of UnderwaterDevices and
its progeny included a duty to obtain competent advice of counsel prior..
to any possible infringing activity4 9 and the possibility that an absence of
legal counsel could imply willfulness,5 0 though the Federal Circuit later
relaxed the drawing of such adverse inferences. 5 ' Thus, whereas
Underwater Devices required actual notice of the patent but only
negligence with regard to determining and avoiding infringement,52
Seagate requires recklessness with regard to determining and avoiding
infringement but has no explicit requirement as to notice. 53 Under the
"objectively high likelihood of infringement" standard in Seagate, a
willful infringer will either ignore the likelihood that a known patent will
be infringed or the likelihood that a relevant patent exists at all. For
example, given a technology space crowded with many patents, Seagate
might well support a finding of recklessness, and therefore of willful

44. See infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.

45. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
46. Id. at 1368 & n.3 (noting that "[bjecause patent infringement is a strict liability offense,
the nature of the offense is only relevant in determining whether enhanced damages are
warranted").

47.
48.
49.
50.

717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1389.
Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

51. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,

1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
52.

UnderwaterDevices, 717 F.2d at 1389-90.

53. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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infringement, based on a failure to conduct a patent search.54
By contrast, liability for induced infringement requires that the alleged
inducer knew that the actions she induced constituted infringement.
However, actual knowledge of the patent's existence is not necessary: it
is enough that the alleged inducer believed there was a high probability
that the combination of the components was patented and took deliberate
steps to avoid actual knowledge of that fact.5 6 Liability for contributory
infringement has an even higher standard. This standard requires that the
alleged contributor actually knew that the combination to which her
component contributed was both patented and infringing.5 7
Thus, the statutory actions for induced and contributory infringement
are meaningfully different from the common law remedial basis of willful
infringement.ss One result of this difference is that, read in pari materia
with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which defines infringement as a basic matter,59
both the induced and contributory infringement statutes require an
underlying direct infringement. 60 A second result of this difference is that,
for willful infringement, courts may more readily reshape the necessary
level of knowledge about the existence or infringement of a patent or of

54. See Tomita Techs. USA, LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. 11-4256, 2012 WL 2524770, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2012). The court in Tomita explained:
While an alleged infringer may often need to know of a patent's existence and
scope in order to adequately comprehend the risk she faces, this case amply
demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, an alleged infringer can know of an
"objectively high likelihood" of infringement even though she does not know
that the relevant patent has issued.

Id. at *10. But see Robocast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 3d 320, 335 (D. Del. 2014)
(distinguishing Tomita, the court in Robocast did not find it necessary that an alleged infringer

conduct a patent search, stating "[i]t seems contrary to waive the requirement for a noninfringement opinion when the defendant has knowledge of the patent and yet require a defendant
to undertake a search to see if a patent existed in the first place").

55. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
56. Id. at 2070-71.
57. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964) ("Aro
II").
58. The Patent Act creates induced infringement liability in § 271(b) and contributory
infringement liability in § 271(c).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
60. Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple Inc., 692 F.3d 1351, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining
that "[i]nducement of infringement requires that there be a showing of an underlying act of direct

infringement"); Aro II, 377 U.S. at 483 ("[I]t is settled that if there is no direct infringement of a
patent there can be no contributory infringement." (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top

Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961) ("Aro I"))).
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intent that can be inferred from that knowledge. 6 1 For induced and
contributory infringement, however, the levels of intent that are more
directly implicated in the statutory text make such common law revision
both more unlikely to occur and more incremental when they do. 62
These various heightened requirements of knowledge and intent for
imposing liability for indirect patent infringement have also been the
subject of thoughtful academic discussion. Notable among this discussion
are arguments to reformulate the conception of fault away from a mental
state inquiry, 63 to explore the potential inaptitude of culpability or intent
in quantum-mechanical arts such as nanotechnology, 64 and even to recast
the current patent infringement system as one of "modified strict
liability," often requiring notice of the patent. 65 Like the case law,
however, these arguments accept as given that the underlying act of direct
infringement is a strict liability tort for which liability itself does not
require any intent to infringe nor any notice or knowledge of the patent
or its infringement.66
3. Doubling Down on Strict Liability
The rhetoric and implications of strict liability in patent infringement
are even more salient after the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.67 The dispute in Commil was
one of induced infringement, 68 but the posture of the case raised a side

61. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (expressly
overruling the standard for willful infringement set forth in UnderwaterDevices nearly a quartercentury earlier).

62. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) (according
not only the "special force" of stare decisis to the construction in [Aro II], 377 U.S. 476, of the
intent inquiry for contributory infringement under § 271(c), but also adhering to the same logic in
construing the analogous intent inquiry for induced infringement under § 271(b)).
63. See Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View ofFault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U.

L. REv. 1575, 1580 (2011).
64. See Siddharth Khanijou, Patent Inequity?: Rethinking the Application ofStrict Liability
to Patent Law in the Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. & POt'Y 179, 183 (2007).
65. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent
Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 807-08 (2002).

66. See id at 800-01 (distinguishing between being liable for infringement, for which the
"strict liability" designation is acceptable, and recovering damages, for which the 35 U.S.C. § 287
patent-marking statute requires notice of the patent); Khanijou, supra note 64, at 197 (accepting
direct infringement as a strict liability offense for purposes of infringement liability while
identifying, as Professors Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter do, a notice requirement for the
recovery of damages); Rantanen, supra note 63, at 1590 (accepting direct infringement as a strict
liability offense and focusing instead on willful, induced, and contributory infringement).

67. See 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
68. Id. at 1924.
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debate over direct infringement as well. 69 The case marked the Court's
third recent foray into the tort underpinnings of patent infringement
doctrine.
The first was Global-Tech, in which the Court held that induced
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) requires intent and knowledge not
merely that the induced actions took place but also that the induced
actions constituted infringement. 70 The Court in Global-Tech drew a
basic tort distinction between mental states regarding actions in the world
and mental states regarding those actions' legal consequences. 7 ' As the
Court concluded, induced infringement requires both.72
The second was Limelight, in which the Court held that indirect
infringement requires an underlying direct infringement.7 3 The dispute
before the Court was the divided infringement of a method patent
conducted at arm's length: Limelight had performed some steps, and
other parties outside Limelight's control had performed the rest. 7 4 The en
banc Federal Circuit held Limelight liable for inducement by finding that
while no one was liable for an underlying direct infringement, the
requisite underlying infringement had taken place because all the steps
had been performed. The Court rejected this notion ofjoint tortfeasance,
explaining that if the actions that supposedly constitute direct
infringement are not enough to create liability, then what has taken place
is not direct infringement.76
In both cases, the Court analyzed the intent standard of induced
infringement by comparing it to direct infringement, which produced
helpful partial answers. Global-Tech properly distinguished between
intent as to actions and intent as to the actions' legal implications.7 7
Limelight originally punted on that distinction as to direct infringement,
though it did pose the issue helpfully through divided infringement: even
if the actions of multiple parties when considered collectively would
directly infringe a patent, why should their actions be considered
collectively in the first place? 7 8 The question, though helpful, remained
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id at 1926.
Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
Id. at 2065.
Id. at 2067-68.
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115 (2014).

74. Id. at 2115-16.

75. Id. at 2116-17.
76. Id. at 2117-18.
77. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065 and text accompanying note 71. On rehearing, an
en banc Federal Circuit addressed this distinction. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks,
Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (2015) (en banc) (per curiam).
78. Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2117-18. For a more detailed discussion of the proper role for
tortious intent in divided patent infringement, see infra Section III.D.
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unanswered in Limelight.79
Prior to Commil, induced infringement required the following
conditions: A patent must actually be directly infringed; the alleged
inducer must know that it induced certain actions; and the alleged inducer
must know that the actions that it induced constituted infringement of the
patent. 0 The question before the Court in Commil was whether the
alleged inducer must also know that the patent was valid-whether a
good-faith belief in the patent's invalidity is sufficient to defeat a claim
of induced infringement. 8 ' The Federal Circuit majority in Commil
correctly observed that because direct infringement requires a patent to
be valid,8 2 intent or knowledge that the patent is valid is relevant to the
requisite intent or knowledge that the direct infringement took place.8 3
Put another way, just as one cannot infringe an invalid patent, someone
who believes in good faith that a patent is invalid cannot intend for it to
be infringed.84
Affirming the Federal Circuit's conclusion in Commil would,
desirably, have identified even more clearly the tort law distinction,
between mental states regarding (induced) actions and mental states
regarding the legal implications of those actions. Yet, the Court in
Commil ignored this distinction and said only that "infringement and
validity are separate issues under the [Patent] Act," so knowledge or
intent regarding one does not necessarily implicate knowledge or intent
regarding the other.8 5
Moreover, the Court's opinion did not merely forgo an opportunity to
clarify the confused view of tortious intent in patent infringement
doctrine. It also echoed the Government's (supporting Commil)
79. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's en banc opinion and remanded the
case for further consistent proceedings, and the Federal Circuit reiterated its earlier conclusion
that the facts of the case did not satisfy the governing standard for divided infringement (this time
without its overturned inducement theory). On rehearing in the Federal Circuit, the court
addressed infringement divided among different actors and found that entities can be responsible
for others' performance in two instances: "(1) where that entity directs or controls others'
performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise."
80. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d

1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 13-896), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 752 (2014), andvacated, 135
S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
81. Id. at i (seeking review on "[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a
defendant's belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(b)").
82. Commil, 720 F.3d at 1368 (explaining that "[i]t is axiomatic that one cannot infringe an
invalid patent").

83. Id
84. See Brief of Professor Saurabh Vishnubhakat as Amicus Curiae in Support of

Respondent at 2-3, Commil, 135 S. Ct. 1920 (No. 13-896).
85. Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928.
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interpretation of the Court's own prior dicta that direct infringement, as a
baseline matter, is a strict liability offense. 86
Tracing this dicta backward from Commil provides some of the
clearest provenance for the strict liability error in patent law. In Commil,
the Court cited a footnote from Global-Tech, which states, "Direct
infringement has long been understood to require no more than the
unauthorized use of a patented invention. Thus, a direct infringer's
knowledge or intent is irrelevant."87 The footnote fails to support the
strict liability conclusion. On its own terms, it does not specify what is
irrelevant about the alleged direct infringer's mental state: knowledge or
intent about its own actions, or knowledge or intent about the legal
consequences of those actions.
In fact, both of the sources the Commil Court cited suggest only that
knowledge or intent about legal consequences is irrelevant.8 ' The Court's
1964 opinion in Aro II only restated the text of § 271(a) that making,
using, or selling the invention without authority is an infringement. 89
Professor Walker and, later, Professor Anthony Deller explained that
only direct infringement requires neither knowledge of the patent nor
appreciation that one's act is infringement. 90 These propositions, without
more, do not amount to strict liability. If either treatise could plausibly
have concluded that one can be a direct infringer even without intent to
commit the relevant actions, for example, strict liability would have been
a more defensible view.
Because the role of tortious intent in direct infringement was not
before the Court in Commil,9 1 this passing reference to strict liability
remains dicta, but it highlights the pervasiveness of the confusion that
surrounds the infringement doctrine with respect to its tort underpinnings.
4. What Strict Liability Really Means
Looking to tort law itself is a useful way to compare what strict
liability means as a conceptual matter to evaluate what it means in the
borrowed sense that patent law has employed. At first blush, it may seem
formalistic to distinguish between standards such as actual intent,
recklessness, and willful blindness for determining willful infringement

86. Id. at 1926.
87. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
88. See Aro It, 377 U.S. at 484; 3 DELLER, supra note 30,

§ 453.

89. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 484.
90. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.

91. Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1926 (stating that the "precise issue to be addressed concerns a
claim of improper inducement to infringe").
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on one hand 92 and so-called strict liability for determining direct
infringement on the other hand. Certainly, the Federal Circuit has a welldocumented reputation for formalism in its jurisprudence. 93 It is also
questionable whether tort law itself supports such distinctions. Ifnot, then
the best argument for distinguishing among levels of purposive action in
various forms of patent infringement may be simply that patent
jurisprudence requires some measure of formalism to minimize needless
disruption to existing doctrine. Nevertheless, if tort law does plausibly
support such distinctions, then the case is even stronger insofar as the
debates in tort theory can offer greater transparency to the applied case
of the tort of patent infringement.
In fact, categorical distinctions are not anathema to tort. Despite the
general hostility in modern tort law toward formalism or conceptualism, 94
early legal realist views of tort were more concerned with rejecting any
single unifying theory of tort doctrine. 95 In this project, realist tort
scholars such as Professor Fleming James readily adopted categorical
distinctions when it suited them. 96 It was Professor James himself who:.
first differentiated intentional torts, negligent torts, and so-called strict
liability torts to describe what he called the "heterogeneous mass of stuff'
that was injury law. 9 7
Tort law's own view of strict liability is mixed. The corrective justice
strain of the tort literature increasingly questions whether strict liability
even exists any longer as a doctrine that is analytically distinct from
negligence. 98 For example, in his unambiguously titled assessment, The
Death of Strict Liability, Professor Peter Gerhart argued that strict
92. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for willful
infringement).
93. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Complicity in Federal Circuit
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2003) (discussing the Federal
Circuit's bias of articulating bright-line rules at the cost of fairness and the Supreme Court's recent
decisions enabling this formalism agenda); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiinstitutionalApproach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1103-10 (2003)
[hereinafter Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy] (reviewing Federal Circuit formalism in the context
of patent reform); John R. Thomas, Formalismat the FederalCircuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774
(2003) (exploring the recent trends in the Federal Circuit toward formalism and its potential for
negatively impacting innovation policy).
94. See James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products
Liability: A Case Study in American PragmaticInstrumentalism,39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 443, 49091 (1995) (describing the "anti-formalist turn in American thought" that characterized the

pragmatic development of strict liability).
95. Id at 490.
96. See Fleming James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the JudicialProcess, 8
BUFF. L. REv. 315, 321 (1959).

97. Id at 315.
98. Peter M. Gerhart, The Death ofStrict Liability, 56 BUFF. L. REv. 245,271(2008).
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liability was originally different from negligence in only one way. 9 9
Negligence could penalize no more than failures to exercise due care, but
reasonable care could still produce externalities that the law has a
normative interest in mitigating.' 0 0 To cast the necessary wider net, socalled strict liability arose to evaluate not the quality of care, but the
quality of the decision making related to the activity itself.'o' Such
decisions may pertain to a variety of traits associated with the activity,
such as where or when it is done, how frequently, and by what method. 1 0 2
In fact, these more finely grained evaluations of activity-based decisions
are a subset of the general label of "abnormally dangerous" or
"ultrahazardous" activities with which strict liability is traditionally
identified.' 0 3 Importantly, however, evaluating activity-based decisions
does not require wholly disregarding fault as in the customary
understanding of strict liability.1 04
The upshot, according to Professor Gerhart, is that in trying to move
beyond the inability of negligence to deter conduct that is reasonable as
to due care but unreasonable in other ways, the notion of strict liability
has been an overcompensation. On one hand, a fault-based view of
unreasonable activity-based decisions can cast the wider net that strict
liability purports to offer. In other words, the strict liability cases would,
in the main, have turned out the same if the courts had more precisely
evaluated the quality of the tortfeasor's activity-based decisions rather
than claiming broadly to allocate liability without fault.' 0 On the other
hand, activity-based decisions may also be reasonable as to place, time,
frequency, method, etc., leaving a pure residual risk of the truly
unavoidable accident-one that could take place even if one exercised
due care and made entirely reasonable activity-based decisions.1 06 The
strict liability cases have not imposed liability to the extent of these truly
unavoidable accidents, where even activity-based decisions were

99. Id at 251 (summarizing the difference between so-called strict liability and negligence).
See generally Steven Shavell, Liabilityfor Accidents, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND EcoNOMics

(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007) (discussing a theoretical treatment of strict
liability as an incentive system for reducing accident costs); Steven Shavell, StrictLiability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) (comparing strict liability and negligence rules based on
the incentives they provide).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Gerhart, supra note 98, at 251.
Id. at 251-53.
Id. at 247.
Id
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 297-306 (arguing that the outcomes of strict liability cases are actually

applications of Gerhart's fault-based theory).

106. Id. at 254-55.
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reasonable. 10 7 Indeed, the only way to force actors to internalize the pure
residual risk of truly unavoidable accidents would be to turn to some
purely distributive justice theory of tort where loss distribution entirely
trumps individual agency, though the current body of tort law has largely
remained with corrective justice.' 0 8
Historically, this distinction between activity-based risks that persist
despite due care and residual risks that represent truly unavoidable
accidents has been most salient in the context of products liability. 109 In
that context, the philosophical arguments of pragmatism, the policy
prescriptions of institutional economics, and the jurisprudential approach
of legal realism ultimately led to a pair of seminal judicial decisions that
articulated what the purpose and profile of strict liability would be.I 0
First was MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,'11 in which the purchaser
of a car was injured when a defective wooden wheel in the car crumbled,
causing the car to collapse.1 12 Though defendant Buick had not
manufactured the wheel but merely installed it, Justice Benjamin Cardozo
found liability "irrespective of [privity of] contract" because Buick had
knowledge of a probable danger and had a duty to make its automobiles
with care. 113

The second was Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,114 in
which a restaurant waitress was injured when a bottle of Coca Cola
spontaneously exploded in her hand, severing a number of blood vessels,
nerves, and muscles in her thumb and palm."' Though the court found
defendant Coca Cola liable on a fault-based res ipsa loquitor theory of
negligence,"l 6 Justice Roger Traynor in a concurring opinion argued for
what he called an "absolute liability" for manufacturers who place articles
in commerce that prove injuriously defective." 7 Less than twenty years
later, the Escola concurrence prevailed in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.," 8 with Justice Traynor writing for a unanimous court.1 9
107. Id. at 307 (accepting that "no-fault liability is theoretically possible" but that all cases
of accidents, despite due care, were actually about unreasonable activity-based decisionmaking-and thus still about fault).

108. Id at 248-49.
109. See id. at 286-88.
110. Hackney, supra note 94, at 489 (referring to "the landmark judicial opinions"
implementing the theoretical legal realist case for strict liability).

111. I 1IN.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1053.
150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
Id. at438.
Id. at 440.
Id (Traynor, J., concurring).

118. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
119. Id. at 898.
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These formative product liability cases suggest the uncertainly
cabined nature of strict liability. In MacPherson, Justice Cardozo
declined to divorce the defendant manufacturer's purposive actions from
its liability, expressly requiring knowledge on the part of the
manufacturer of a danger "not merely possible, but probable." 20 By
comparison in Escola, Justice Traynor made an essentially distributive
argument regarding a manufacturer's ability to internalize the cost to
"reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products."'21
However, he justified this allocation of risk on the grounds that the risk
of injury or defect associated with manufacturing is "a constant risk and
a general one," thus requiring a constant and general protection that the
manufacturer is best positioned to provide.1 2 2 How constant and how
general the risk may be are empirical questions, and the manufacturer can
undoubtedly do much to mitigate that risk by internalizing the cost of
changing its activity-based decisions.1 2 3 Yet expanding tort liability
beyond failures of due care to failures of activity-based decisions is still
a fault-based regime.
What remains unclear is whether this activity-based view of products
liability fully realizes Justice Traynor's concerns in Escola, or whether
products liability is so distributive as to capture pure residual risk akin,
in Professor Gerhart's example, to requiring one person to be liable when
lightning strikes another.1 24 The literature suggests that neither is fully
true: fully distributive strict liability is the rule for manufacturing defects
whereas a fault-based reasonableness standard is the rule for design
defects and warning defects.1 2 5
From this debate within tort law itself of what strict liability comprises
and of what corrective and distributive values strict liability promotes,
patent law can gain much needed clarity about how to allocate the risks,
costs, and losses associated with the tort of patent infringement. The
instrumental goals and balances involved in patent infringement and
related doctrines do not justify a fully distributive form of economic
liability that is concerned only with spreading loss without regard to
agency or purposive action. Therefore, the way tort law frames the
concept of strict liability is not only a careless view of direct
infringement, but also a normatively inappropriate one. An important
120. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
121. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 441.
123. See Gerhart, supra note 98, at 247 (discussing the activity-based parameters of place,
time, frequency, and method).
124. Id. at 311.
125. See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict"Products Liability

Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 744.
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result of this mistaken strict liability view is that the burden of avoiding
infringement appears to fall entirely on the public's ability to understand
precisely the boundaries of patent rights-entirely on the patent notice
requirement.
B. The OverburdenedNotice Requirement
Critiques and defenses of the U.S. patent system regard notice as an
essential function and diverge largely on whether the current system
adequately performs that function. 12 6 The indeterminacy that results from
inadequate notice is forceful evidence that the law does not warrant the
exclusionary power of patents and that their assertion is an illegitimate
restraint of economic activity. Notice itself is not a unitary principle but
rather a shorthand for two related requirements of the patent systemone prescriptive and the other descriptive. These forms of notice, in turn,
call for precision and accuracy to be effective. For evaluating the impact
of a strict liability view on direct infringement, it is precision in
prescriptive notice that is of greatest importance.
1. Two Metaphors of Patent Notice
Prescriptive notice, or boundary notice about the scope of a patent's
claims, is what most discussions of the patent system mean by the term
"notice" in advocacy, 127 adjudication, 12 8 and academic discourse.1 29

Descriptive notice, or notice about the nature of the invention and how to
practice it, is more commonly understood as the teaching function of
126. Compare, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46-72 (2009) (arguing that patents
currently provide inadequate notice as to their boundaries and therefore do not merit their broad
property-like rights to enjoin others), with David J. Kappos, Investing in America's Future
Through Innovation: How the Debate over the Smart PhonePatent Wars (Re)Raises Issues at the
Foundation of Long-Term Incentive Systems, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 485, 494-97 (2013)
(arguing that ongoing administrative reforms in patent examination together with recent Federal
Circuit case law and industry best practices have improved the clarity and correspondence
between what patents disclose and what they claim, largely fulfilling the notice function).
127. See, e.g., Defendant-Appellee's Response to Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening En Banc
Brief at 40, McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 8, 2011),

2011 WL 3796780 (citing Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing the function of the patent system's public notice function as providing
"notice of the boundaries of the right to exclude").

128. See, e.g., Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (2005)
(referring to notice as information about the "enforceable boundary of the commercial patent

right").
129. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking
Patent Claim Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745-46 (2009) (describing the notice
function of patents as "setting out clear boundaries to warn the public of what is and is not

claimed").
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patents.1 3 0 Thus, the institutional design of the patent system must resolve
two subjects of indeterminacy: (1) the boundary notice function of
delineating ex ante the scope of the exclusionary rights that a patent
confers and (2) the teaching function of describing and enabling the
practice of the patented invention.
Debate over the operation and fulfillment of the boundary notice and
teaching functions has relied much on metaphors of trespass and contract,
respectively.13' The boundary notice function reflects a need for clear,
discernible limits so that others may avoid trespassing on the patentee's
rights similar to how physical fences guard against unauthorized entry on
real property. 13 2 The teaching function reflects a bargained-for exchange
between an inventor and society where the inventor conveys a descriptive
and enabling disclosure about her invention while in return society
conveys a limited right for the inventor to exclude others from practicing
it. 13 3 Both metaphors resonate strongly in American culture-the trespass
metaphor with the importance of private property 3 4 and the contract
metaphor with the importance of agreement as an exercise of
autonomy.1 3 5 In this conception, moreover, the contract must precede the
trespass because the bargain between inventor and society is what
legitimates the inventor's property-like right against the encroachment of
others' practice of her invention. If a patent does not give adequate notice
about its boundaries, then the inventor has not kept her end of the patent
bargain, and her exclusionary assertion of the patent is no longer a
protection of her own rights against encroachment but is rather an
illegitimate encroachment on the rights of others. Thus, the patent
holder's argument from trespass is in tension with the alleged
130. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (2004)
(distinguishing notice about what the invention is and how to practice it from notice about the
boundaries of what the patent allows one to exclude others from doing).
131. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Cognitive Economy and the Trespass Fallacy: A Response to

Professor Mossoff, 65 FLA. L. REV. F. 38, 38-39 (2014).
132. Eg., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887,900 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (referring to the violation
of a patent right as a "trespass"). See generally Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent

Law, 65 FLA. L. REv. 1687, 1692-94 (describing the history of the trespass metaphor in patent
law).

133. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (describing the patent
system as "a carefully crafted bargain"); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484
(1973) (describing disclosure as "the quidpro quo of the right to exclude"). The Supreme Court
has further noted that the metaphor of bargained-for exchange is particular to patents. See Eldred

v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (stating that "our references to a quid pro quo typically
appear in the patent context").
134. David Fagundes, PropertyRhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 677

(2010).
135. Tal Kastner, The PersistingIdeal ofAgreement in an Age of Boilerplate, 35 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 793, 796-97 (2010).
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infringer's-indeed, society's-argument from contract.
The practical effect of this tension on direct infringement is that the
delineation of clear boundaries in the patent right is the more important
aspect of patent notice, as the boundaries of the patent are what define
whether infringement has taken place at all. The patent bargain, for its
part, is presumed to be fulfilled because the law itself presumes that an
issued patent is valid. 13 6 Moreover, in a regime widely believed to impose
strict liability for direct infringement, without regard to prior knowledge
of the patent or intent to commit infringement, proper boundary notice
bears the heavy burden of legitimating the exclusionary power of patents
against the public. As the ongoing debate over ex ante notice of claim
scope shows, that burden as currently understood is likely an unbearable
one.
2. Notice of Claim Scope
Because the boundaries of patent rights reside in the claims of a
patent,13 7 evaluating boundary notice is an exercise in construing patent
claims. 13 8 Claims that do not lend themselves to ex ante construction1 3 9
reflect poor boundary notice, 14 0 a problem that is particularly acute where
it requires expensive litigation to adjudicate the boundary of the patent
right.141 To be sure, the mere fact that litigation has taken place is not
conclusive of notice failure nor even necessarily of uncertainty more
136. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). The party asserting invalidity bears the burden of overcoming
the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, even when offering evidence not before the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) during examination. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.

P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245-50 (2011).
137. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1280-84
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (observing that a patent claim "sets the boundaries of an exclusionary
right good against the world at large"), vacatedand remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (remanding
for reconsideration in light of Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831

(2015)).
138. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Open E Cry, LLC, 728 F.3d 1309, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
139. The amenability of patent claims to being construed is the patent "definiteness"
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). In recent years, the standard for definiteness had been that a
claim, read in view of the specification and prosecution history, was indefinite only if it was
"insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction" could "properly be adopted." Exxon
Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court
very recently rejected this "insolubly ambiguous" standard and held that for a claim to be definite,
it must "inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty."

Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129-30 (2014).
140. See Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation,68 WASH. & LEE L.
1737, 1772-74 (2011) (relating the susceptibility of patent claims to unique, or at least
manageable, determination with the sufficiency of notice provided by the patent).
141. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J.
REV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

1, 5, 10 (2013).
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generally. Patent litigation proceeds for a variety of reasons, including
high value in the inventionl42 and economic calculations favoring
efficient infringement,1 4 3 as well as uncertainty about whether the patent
is valid or infringed.1" Nevertheless, where so-called "fuzzy
boundaries"l 4 5 result in patent scope that is de facto broad,1 4 6 and where
the exclusionary right is strong and property-like-stronger, in fact, if
strict liability is the rule-the increased risk of infringement can
aggravate the externalities that strategic litigation generates.1 4 7
Framing boundary notice with respect to consistency in claim
construction is only one of two tasks in generating certainty about the

142. See generallyJohn R. Allison et a]., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439-40 (2004)
(discussing the relationships among the value of inventions, the value of patents, and the assertion

of patents in litigation to appropriate value).
143. See Ted Sichelman, PurgingPatentLaw of "PrivateLaw" Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV.
517, 557-58 (arguing that substantial disagreement over patent validity and scope coupled with
high transaction costs in ex ante license negotiation may make infringement the economically

efficient choice). Professor Ted Sichelman compares this to efficient breach in contract theory.
Id. (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119-21 (7th ed. 2007)).
144. See Jay Pil Choi, Patent Litigation as an Informational-TransmissionMechanism, 88

AM. EcoN. REV. 1249, 1250 (1998) (framing the dynamics of market entry as an externality of
patent validity information revealed in litigation). See generally Alan C. Marco & Saurabh
Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103 (2013) (surveying the sources and
implications of uncertainty about the validity and infringement of patents, and estimating the
market value of resolving that uncertainty through adjudicative litigation).

145. Professor Michael Meurer has helped popularize this term in the debate over patent
notice. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 126, at 61, 70; Menell & Meurer, supra note 141,
at 12; Michael J. Meurer, Patent ExaminationPriorities,51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 701-03

(2009).
146. See Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCt. & TECH. L. REV. 219,

245-46 (2011); see also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the
Market and How Should We Change?-The Privateand Social Costs ofPatents, 55 EMORY L.J.

61, 63, 68-69, 70, 77-95 (2006) (using a game-theoretic model to compare quantitatively the
litigation costs and risks as between plaintiff and defendant, and finding that even demonstrably
invalid patents can survive in the market as a result). Uncertainty in boundaries results in

effectively broad boundaries due to risk aversion about the outcomes of patent litigation. See
generally Andrews, supra, at 219 (arguing that the cost and risk of patent litigation have
diminished the value of traditional remedies such as damages and injunctions, leaving patentees
to plan deliberately around a likely up-front settlement).
147. Ted Sichelman, CommercializingPatents, 62 STAN. L. REv. 341, 384 (2010) (arguing
that such litigation "mak[es] the damage award or injunction value to the patentee inefficiently

high relative to the social value of commercialization"); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup andRoyalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1991, 2009-10 (2007) (arguing that where
a patent owner has the ability and legal right "to capture value that has nothing to do with its
invention," the threat of litigation that it can exert results in economically inefficient disincentives

for innovation by others, allegedly infringing firms that have often already sunk significant
investments into research and development themselves).
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scope of patent rights, 4 8 but it is the more important task. Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit in Lighting Ballast Control v. Philips Electronicsl4 9
endorsed the importance of consistent claim construction for providing
what the court called "horizontal certainty," which is of great importance
to the market.15 0 Supplying this interpretive uniformity through de novo
appellate review of claim construction may create "vertical uncertainty"
about the outcomes of individual patent litigations, though the Lighting
Ballast court appears to have accepted amicus representations that such
vertical uncertainty costs are minimal.1 5 ' In practice, greater horizontal
certainty means that a patent claim will mean the same thing in one
district court as in subsequent district courts that construe the same claim.
Greater vertical certainty means that a patent claim will turn out to mean
the same thing in the appellate court as in the trial court below, usually
due to a deferential standard of appellate review. Yet horizontal and
vertical certainty are often in tension with each other.
For example, high horizontal certainty would likely coincide with low
vertical certainty because de novo review of the claim construction would
create actual appellate precedent that consistently binds subsequent trial
courts. Conversely, high vertical certainty would likely coincide with low
horizontal certainty because deferential appellate review can inherently
tolerate multiple inconsistent district court claim constructions. District
courts might accept as persuasive the prior construction of another district
court, but this is neither necessary nor certain. Moreover, horizontal,
certainty concerning how the market understands a given patent claim
corresponds to precise boundary notice, and vertical certainty about how
a given patent claim fares in a particular litigation corresponds with
accurate boundary notice. 15 2 Of these, precision in boundary notice
would seem to be the greater economic and systemic value,
corresponding as it does to greater ex ante certainty around which to make
148. The other task is accuracy as to what the patent actually covers. If the supposed scope
of patent rights is inaccurate (usually inaccurately broad), then the patent is invalid because the
patentee has not fulfilled her end of the patent bargain. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying
text.
149. 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1173

(2015).
150. Id at 1287-88 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc., Dell Inc., EMC
Corporation, Intel Corporation, SAP America, Inc., and SAS Institute Inc. in Support of Neither

Party at 19, Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d 1272 (No. 2012-1014)).
151. Id at 1288-89.
152. Cf Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Inventionfrom the Cult ofthe Claim, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 42 (2012) (characterizing patent claims as proxies for the inventions they protect).

Professor Oskar Liivak cogently explains that the requirement against claim indefinitenesscorresponding here to the boundary notice function-ensures that claims are precise proxies for
the invention, and the requirements for adequate disclosure in patents-corresponding here to the
teaching function-ensure that the claims are accurate proxies.
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investments, conduct research and development, and commercialize
inventions. As a practical matter, however, it is an open empirical
question whether the valuable certainty of precision merits the costly
pursuit of accuracy.1 53 Further compounding the complexity of the
empirical question, trial courts may themselves give deference to
administrative findings by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) determinations of claim scope, an institutional relationship that
is increasingly salient in view of the administrative post-grant patent
reviews that the 2011 America Invents Act has created.
In grappling with this tension, fostering greater precision in the
boundary notice of patent claims has commanded significant attention in
both the literature and governmental efforts at reform, particularly in the
twenty years since the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments.1 55 The Markman decision explained that patent claim
construction is a "mongrel practice" combining legal and factual
determinations, 156 and the decision has since given rise to the ubiquitous
and contentious Markman proceedings early in patent lawsuits. 5 7
In the literature, notable recent proposals to improve boundary notice
include the development or greater use of technical dictionaries and
USPTO-wide or examination art unit-wide glossaries to reduce the
information costs that patent examiners must incur in evaluating
applications for patent.1 5 8 Given the widely noted connection between

153. This was a point that Judge Kathleen O'MaIley's dissent made in Lighting Ballast: the
horizontal certainty purportedly offered by consistent claim construction through de novo

appellate review requires finality (i.e., vertical certainty) in individual judgments. As a result, she
argued, Lighting Ballast and its affirmation of Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), tend to undercut certainty, discourage settlement, and foster litigation

through the final appeal. Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1296, 1310 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
154. For the seminal discussion of the institutional dimensions of deference as between
courts and as between the Judiciary and the Executive on the questions of patent claim scope and
uniformity, see generally Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy, supra note 93, at 1086-1101.

155. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
156. Id. at 377-78.
157. Though Marlanan itself does not require a particular timing for claim construction
within the life cycle of patent litigation, courts have settled on a practice of construing claims after

at least some fact discovery but still early enough to promote settlement in view of the issued
claim construction ruling. See REBECCA N. EYRE, JOE S. CECIL & ERIC TOPOR, FED. JUD. CTR.,
Patent Claim Construction: A Survey of Federal District Court Judges 16-17 (Feb. 2008),

www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/patclaim.pdf/$file/patclaim.pdf.

The practice of premising

claim construction on fact discovery is appropriate given the regularity with which courts "benefit
from explanation of the technology and the instruction of treatises" and from "experts in the
science or technology ... in understanding the meaning and usage of a claim term." Lighting

Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1284-85.
158. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination,46 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173,

198 (2006).
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boundary notice problems and patents on software-related inventions, 15 9
academic proposals have also focused on issues that are particularly
important to software patent litigation, such as functional claiming, 1 6 0 and
on reforms that can disproportionately improve the quality of software
patents, such as the USPTO's new post-grant review powers under the
America Invents Act. 16 1 Notably, some of the most prominent of these
discussions expressly stop short of abolishing software patents altogether
and argue persuasively against industry-specific rules for patent
protection.162
Likewise in government, the White House Task Force on High-Tech
Patent Issues recently directed an executive action toward "tightening
functional claiming" in patents 6 3 through, inter alia, the use of claim
glossaries in the specifications of applications for patent.'6 The 2011
159. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs From NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REv. 387, 391-94 (2014); Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) PatentQuality Through
the Administrative Process, 51 Hous. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (2013) [hereinafter Rai, Improving
(Software) Patent Quality).
160. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law's Functionality Malfunction and the
Problem ofOverbroad, FunctionalSoftware Patents,90 WASH. U. L. REv. 1399, 1427-30 (2013);
Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 Wis. L. REV.

905, 907 (2013) (noting that lawyers have a tendency to broaden claims as much as possible to
acquire the strongest rights for their clients).
161. See, e.g., Rai, Improving (Software) PatentQuality, supra note 159, at 533-39.
162. Eg., DAN

L. BURK &

MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN

SOLVE IT 157-58 (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO

Do ABOUT IT 198 (2004); Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REv. 591, 622
(2008). But see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protectionfor
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-RelatedInventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1029-30
(1990); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 110 (2011).
163. See THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, FACT SHEET: WHITE HOUSE
TASK FORCE ON HIGH-TECH PATENT ISSUES (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues.
164. See generally Glossary Initiative, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/glossary-initiative (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) (providing
an overview of Glossary Initiative, a claim clarity training program). In fact, the USPTO's
exploration of requiring applicant glossaries predates the June 2013 White House announcement
and has been part of a policy agenda directed toward patent quality more generally. See Request

for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 78 Fed. Reg. 2960-61 (Jan. 15, 2013). The
response to these proposals, including the claim glossary requirement, has been mixed. Compare
SUZANNE MICHEL, MICHAEL MEEHAN & WILLIAM G. JENKS, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,

COMMENTS

OF

GOOGLE

INC.

7

(2013),

http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init events/

swglossary_e_google_2013oct23.pdf (supporting glossary usage as a source of efficiency and
&

improved claim clarity), and CHARLES DUAN, JULIE SAMUELS & DANIEL NAZER, U.S. PATENT
TRADEMARK

FOUNDATION

OFFICE,

2

COMMENTS

(2013),

OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE

AND THE ELECTRONIC

FRONTIER

http://www.uspto.gov/patents/initevents/swglossary a_eff
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report of the Federal Trade Commission on aligning patent notice with
competition policy also identified boundary notice difficulties rooted in
functional claiming and other causes, such as variation of technical
nomenclature and the patent system's institutional preference for
deferring the resolution of ambiguity in patent rights.' 6 5
The vigor and scope of these debates and proposals reflect the high
stakes of failure in boundary notice and emphasize the policy challenge
that patent law must resolve if direct infringement continues to be
mistakenly regarded as a strict liability offense whose principal
justification resides in providing adequate notice to the public about the
boundaries of patent rights. Conversely, a doctrine of direct infringement
that properly accounts for the tortious intent of alleged infringers can
offer both powerful new solutions to the current patent policy debate and
a theoretical underpinning for existing proposals that are thus far
pragmatic departures from the legal theory of patent infringement.
II. AN INTENTIONAL TORT THEORY OF INFRINGEMENT

The thrust of Part I has been that the law of direct patent infringement
is incorrect to conclude that disregarding any knowledge of a patent or
any intent to infringe the patent is synonymous with strict liability, as this
conclusion ignores an additional necessary inquiry: whether the alleged
infringer intended to perform an act that constitutes infringement. Part II
argues that the direct infringement doctrine should expressly inquire into
this tortious intent and that such an inquiry follows from well-understood
tort principles that connect purposive action to liability in tort.
A. Tort and the Exercise ofAgency
The exercise of agency through purposive action has increasingly
become an explicitly theorized basis for the corrective justice that tort
offers. In brief, the argument from purposive action in justifying tort
liability regards the exercise of agency as a necessary condition,1 6 6 or at
2013oct24.pdf (same), with E-mail from Manny W. Schecter, Chief Patent Counsel for IBM
Corp., & Alison D. Mortinger, Counsel of Strategy and Policy for IBM Corp., to
SoftwareRoundtable2013@uspto.gov (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init-events/
swgIossary_eibm_2013oct03.pdf (expressing skepticism about glossary usage due to burdens of
time and cost as well as the potential for downstream narrowing effects on claims), and Letter
from Robert R. Sachs to Janet Gongola, Patent Reform Coordinator, U. S. Patent & Trademark

Office (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init-events/swglossaryfsachs 2013
nov01.pdf (critiquing, inter alia, the potential in glossary usage for additional strategic behavior
in patent prosecution).
165. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE

AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 80-86 (2011).
166. See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 26

(1995) (arguing that "the claims of corrective justice arise only with respect to losses occasioned
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least a normatively appropriate one,167 to ensure that tort law adequately
"secures favorable conditions for the exercise of our rational agency." 6 8
These themes are apparent in the roles that intent and the appreciation of
consequences have implicitly played in the historical development of tort
law.
1. A Brief History of Tort
Tort originated in two common law writs: the writ for the action of
trespass and the writ for the action of trespass on the case. 1 6 9 The two
causes of action distinguished between forcible and direct injury
(trespass) and indirect and consequential injury (case).1 7 0 Trespass came
first,17 1 and its emphasis on forcible and direct injury reflects the criminal
law origin of the action for trespass, which emerged to remedy actions
"done by force and arms against the king's peace." 7 2
Though the writs for trespass and case focused on direct versus
indirect causation of the plaintiffs injury rather than on the defendant's
intent, intent was nevertheless important to the development of trespass
and case as actions in tort. For example, the existing action of novel
disseisin had been available when an intrusion onto land led to one's

by human agency" notwithstanding specific disagreements about the relevant limitations,
conditions, or importance of such agency); John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort
Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 609
(2005) (observing that "tort law, by articulating and enforcing relational duties, treats actors as
agents who are responsible to others for the consequences of their actions").
167. See Tony Honord, Responsibility and Luck, 104 L.Q. REv. 530, 531, 539-41 (1988)
(advancing an "outcome-responsibility" argument that choosing is a necessary act of agency, that
exercising agency requires accepting the consequences of choices, and that normatively allocating

liability for consequences is respectful of human agency).
&

168. Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck, 2 J. ETHICS
Soc. PHIL. 1, 11 (2006).

169. See JOHN W. SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF

LIABILITY FOR CIVIL INJURIES 155 (2d ed. 1907). These actions came to be known simply as
"trespass" and "case," respectively.
170. See id. at 155-57. This conceptual focus on degrees of causation was altogether
different from the later interest in the existence and degree of the tortfeasor's intentions. Id. at

157.
171.

See

3

THOMAS

ATKINS

STREET,

THE FOUNDATIONS

OF

LEGAL

LIABILITY:

A

PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 248-51 (1906) (tracing

the emergence of trespass on the case from the earlier action for trespass through Parliament's
exercise of the 1285 Statute of Westminster II, which granted it the right to issue new writs and
thereby create new legal rights in the King's common law courts).

172. Id. at 229-30.
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dispossession of the land' 7 3 or even to quiet enjoyment of it. 17 4 The action

required a competing claim of interest beyond mere intrusion, and
making this distinction was an inquiry into the alleged wrongdoer's
intent. 175 Such intent-based bifurcations also existed between criminal
larceny and civil recovery of chattels, and between criminal felonious
assault and minor civil batteries.1 76
Once established, the writs for trespass and case only gradually shifted
from a distinction of causal sequence to the modem distinction between
conduct that is intentional and conduct that reflects a lower degree of
purposive action, such as a negligent omissions.1 7 7 The shift, moreover,
was not a one-to-one correspondence: a writ of trespass could lie even for
negligent injuries so long as they were direct, whereas indirect injuries
required an action on the case even if the injuries were intentionally
inflicted.17 8 Regardless, from its earliest days, tort law has recognized in
one way or another differentiable levels of intent reflecting purposive
actions behind alleged bad acts and has translated those differences into
legal distinctions.
2. Gradations of Tortious Intent
The transition to modem intent-based tort law increasingly recognized
two important principles. First, pure accident should generally not form
the basis of liability, and at least some wrongful intent or some failure to
exercise due care should be necessary.1 79 Second, the degree of liability
imposed should be commensurate with the alleged wrongdoer's degree
of purposive action and her appreciation of the consequences of that
action. 8 o Thus, liability ought to be mildest for conduct that is
inadvertent (though still negligent by the relevant standard of care),
harsher for conduct that disregards likely effects, harsher still for conduct
that is intentional but without malice, and harshest for conduct that is
maliciously intentional.'1 8
The importance of purposive action and appreciation of consequences
is further evident in modem tort law's definition of intent itself, which is
acting to accomplish a result or believing that the result was substantially
173. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW:

BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1, at 38 (2d ed. 1899).

174. See id. at 34-36 (discussing the medieval concept of "seisin" both as possession and
enjoyment protected by the action for disseisin, or dispossession).
175. See STREET, supra note 171, at 227.

176. See id. at 240-44.
177. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 36-38 (1941).

178. See, e.g., Leame v. Bray, (1803) 102 Eng. Rep. 724, 724-28 (K.B.), 3 East 593-96.
179. See PROSSER, supra note 177, at 39.

180. See id. at 39-40.
181. Id
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certain to follow. 182 Intent, thus defined, informs all torts that require high
purposive action and appreciation of consequences, including invasions
of personhood such as battery,183 assault,184 and false imprisonment,'18 as
well as invasions of personal property such as trespass to chattels 86 and
conversion.18 7 This definition of intent also informs trespass to land,' 88
the tort most often analogized to patent infringement. 8 9
3. The Instructive Case of Trespass to Land
Canonically, every form of trespass to land requires some level of
intent. Unauthorized entry with intent creates liability even if the
possessor of the land suffers no harm.1 90 Accordingly, mistake is no
defense, and with one exception, even a reasonable contrary belief of law
or fact does not excuse liability.191 Entry based upon a lower level of
intent, such as reckless or negligent conduct, creates liability if it causes
the possessor of the land a recognized harm. 192 Likewise, an entry that is
unintentional and non-negligent does not create liability even if it harms
the possessor. 19 3

It is worth examining whether this common law framework reflects a
normative principle that a given level of intent is necessary to justify a
given level of liability, or merely that a given level of intent is sufficient
to justify a given level of liability. If these different levels of intent are
necessary to justify their respective levels of land trespass liability, then
the most stringent liability, one imposed without regard to harm, may
182. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("The word
'intent' is used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result
from it."), with PROSSER, supra note 177, at 40 ("A person intends a result when he acts for the

purpose of accomplishing it, or believes that the result is substantially certain to follow from his
act.").
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

§§

13, 18.

Id. §§ 21-34.
Id. §§ 35-38, 40, 43-45.
Id §§ 216-218, 221-222.
Id §§ 222A-224, 226-227, 229-231, 233, 237.
Id. § 158.

189. See supra Subsection I.B.1 (discussing the trespass metaphor of patent infringement).
See generally Mossoff, supra note 132 (critiquing on theoretical and empirical grounds the
comparison of trespass to land with all encroachments upon the patent right).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158.
191. Id § 164. A mistake of law or fact may excuse liability when the conduct of the

possessor induces such a mistake. Id.

§ 164 cmt. b.

192. Id § 165. Liability under this principle also arises where the intruder is engaged in an
abnormally dangerous activity. Id

193. Id

§ 166. This exemption from liability does not apply where the intruder is engaged in

an abnormally dangerous activity. Id.
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arise only from an intentional trespass to land; negligence or even
recklessness will not do. Likewise, trespass that is both unintentional and
accidental cannot support liability even where harm has occurred;
recklessness or at least negligence is necessary. Conversely, if these
different levels of intent are merely sufficient but not necessary to justify
corresponding levels of liability, then diminished intent or even an
absence of intent may support liability.
The principles of common law trespass to land refute the latter view.
Absence of intent cannot support any liability for trespass to land.1 94 Put
another way, trespass to land is not a strict liability tort. Moreover,
diminished intent such as recklessness or negligence cannot support
liability without regard to harm.' 95 For trespass to land, therefore, the
different levels of intent are not merely sufficient but necessary to justify
a commensurate level of liability. In fact, as Professor William Prosser
identifies, this commensurability principle largely holds for torts in
general.1 96
Importantly, the relevant inquiry for trespass to land at each level on
this commensurability scale is neither whether there was an intent to
violate the possessor's rights nor whether there was even any knowledge
that such rights exist, but simply whether there was an intent to perform
the intrusive act: entering the land.1 9 7 So also for direct patent
infringement, the tortious intent is to perform the infringing act: making,
selling, or using the patented invention.
The analogy between trespass to land and patent infringement has
long persisted in the law as a descriptive matter,1 98 but the normative
relevance of trespass to the patent system is an issue of ongoing debate.
So although tort law's principle of commensurability, between liability
for the tort and the level of purposive intent animating the tort, is not
limited to trespass, the prevalent application of trespass to patent
infringement warrants discussion about the continuing suitability of this
analogy.
Even Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer implicitly accept,
in their critique of patents for providing less clear notice than the real
194. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
195. Id.
196. Professor Prosser stated the principle quite broadly that "regardless of the form of the
action, there should be no liability for pure accident." PROSSER, supra note 177, at 39.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

164 cmt. a.

198. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (explaining in the language of real property surveying that a patent claim "provides the
metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers"); Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604
(C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6,742) (comparing an inventor to a farmer by stating that the inventor
"holds a property in his invention by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock"); see
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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property trespass system would tolerate, that trespass doctrine is quite
relevant to patent infringement. Their critique assumes that property
rights such as rights to land present a useful economic benchmark for how
property rights, especially the right to exclude others, ought to
function.' 9 9 Thus, their argument finding notice failure in patents is not
that real property has no lessons for the patent system. 2 00 In fact, as to
liability, they see a "crucial" similarity between the two legal regimes in
disregarding knowledge or intent for determining liability. 2 0 1
Yet this comparison, correct so far as it goes, simply restates the
conventional strict liability view of patent infringement 2 02 while ignoring
the tortious intent of an alleged infringer-or of an alleged trespasser. 2 0 3
Instead, Professors Bessen and Meurer conclude that the patent system is
not specific enough in delineating boundaries to justify property rights
akin to those that guard against trespass to land.2 04
There is some force to the counterargument that Professors Bessen
and Meurer's indeterminacy critique is unduly reductive of real property,
e.g., their contrast between the scope of real property rights and the scope,,,,
of patent rights. 2 0 5 The full scope of a right in real property consists of
temporal and functional boundaries in addition to physical ones, and the
scope of an estate in real property is not captured solely, or even.
primarily, by a fence around land.20 6 Rather, defining rights of
199. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 126, at 29-45 (drawing comparisons
between the respective economics of tangible property rights and patent rights).
200. See id. at 30 (asserting that "the economics of property has valuable lessons for the
economics of patents").
201. Professors Bessen and Meurer argue that "[a] trespasser is still liable regardless of
whether she was mistaken about a property line or took care to avoid trespass. Similarly a
technology-adopter is still liable for patent infringement regardless of whether she independently
invented or made a good-faith effort to avoid intruding on someone's patent rights." Id at 31.
202. See supra Subsections I.A.1-2.

203. As previously discussed, there is no trespass to land where the unauthorized entry was
unintentional and non-negligent. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
204. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 126, at 46-72.
205. Professors Bessen and Meurer argue:
The scope of tangible property is relatively easy to define in terms of physical
attributes. For example, the scope of land rights is defined by a boundary traced
on the earth. Defining the scope of patent rights is extremely difficult, because it
is hard to draw a boundary around an idea.

Id at 32. Similarly, Professor Tun-Jen Chiang has found the boundaries of patent rights lacking
in clarity by comparison to the stability of fences around real property. See Tun-Jen Chiang,
Fixing PatentBoundaries, 108 MICH. L. REv. 523, 527-31 (2010).

206. See Mossoff, supra note 132, at 1698-99. Professor Adam Mossoff argues that
comparing patent indeterminacy to land trespass alone is a logical fallacy in the conceptual sense,
as it commits a category mistake. See id at 1696-1704. He adds that the supposed clarity of notice
as a bulwark against trespass to land is also unverified as an empirical matter. See id at 1704-10.
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possession, use, disposition, and future interests, etc., is the greater task
of real property, and in that exercise, construing the terms of wills, deeds,
and similar documents is much like construing patent claims. 2 07 Yet, this
counterargument does little more than reduce the scope of patent
indeterminacy to be evaluated, leaving open a more limited analogical
role for trespass. Trespass has just such a role to play as to the specific
doctrine of direct patent infringement. 2 0 8 In fact, real property offers a
variety of examples where tortious intent is necessary to create liability
for trespass to land.20 9
Perhaps the simplest case of non-trespass for inadequate tortious
intent is falling by accident onto another's land. For example, in
Puchlopekv. PortsmouthPower Co., 2 10 a schoolboy died when he slipped
and his arm entered between two pickets of the fence that enclosed a
transformer station, coming in contact with a high-voltage wire.2 1 1
Though the jury at trial accepted the power station's defense that the boy
was a trespasser, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire disagreed,
finding that the boy's arm entered onto the power station's land
involuntarily, which could not constitute trespass. 2 1 2 Quite apart from
whether the boy intended to commit trespass or knew who owned the
power station, the court focused on the simple fact that he had not
intended to enter the land.2 13
Trespass also fails where a third party physically forces the would-be
trespasser to either enter the land or remain there. Thus, in Hayes v.
Bushey,2 14 the Supreme Court of Maine held that a truck driver who had
left the highway and crashed into a building was not liable because he
had been driving lawfully with due care, and another driver's car forced
him off the road.2 15 Similarly, in Feiges v. Racine Dry Goods Co.,216 the
owner of a dry goods store had been unable to leave the building to which
his lease was due to expire because a picket line of striking employees
had blocked all entries and exits.2 17 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
207. See Mossoff, supra note 132, at 1699-1700.
208. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 131, at 40 (arguing that rather than generalizing up to the
level of estate boundaries as Professor Mossoff suggests, the patent indeterminacy debate should
"ask what subsidiary doctrine of patent law is commensurate in analytical scope with the doctrine

of trespass in real property" and proposing direct patent infringement as that subsidiary doctrine).
209. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

136 A. 259 (N.H. 1926).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 260.
Id.
196 A.2d 823 (Me. 1964).
Id at 826.
285 N.W. 799 (Wis. 1939).
Id at 799.
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found no trespass, holding that although the store owner had physically
remained past his permission to do so, he had no intent to stay and the
"stress of circumstances" prevented him from leaving. 2 18
These cases reflect settled common law property principles requiring
an intent to enter land for trespass liability to arise. 2 1 9 Just as an action for
trespass protects a real property right against a direct invasion of the
underlying subject of the right (the land), an action for direct infringement
also protects a patent right from direct invasion of the underlying subject
of that right (the invention). In operationalizing that analogous role, the
intentional tort theory of infringement draws much from the history and
principles of trespass to land.2 20
Though largely ignored and untheorized by patent law, the tortious
intent inquiry also comports with the language of the Patent Act and
provides a potential resolution for an important practical debate currently
taking place in patent infringement law.
B. Tortious Intent in PatentInfringement
However well grounded the doctrine of tortious intent may be in
common law tort principles, it must also rest on the statutory foundations
of the U.S. patent system. In fact, not only does the text of the direct
patent infringement statute support an inquiry into tortious intent, but
federal appellate case law on statutory interpretation confirms the textual
argument.
1. The Statutory Basis for Tortious Intent
The Patent Act regards as a direct infringer "whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor." 22 1
The use of four transitive verbs-"makes," "uses,"' "offers," and
"sells"-to specify the set of infringing actions is consistent with
requiring purposive action on the part of an alleged infringer. The level
of purpose may be as minimal as seeking to accomplish the natural result
of the act itself or to believe that such a result is substantially certain to
follow, e.g., an alleged infringer must seek to accomplish the result of
selling something: the sale of the thing. Whether the alleged infringer was
additionally mistaken or wholly ignorant of the act's legal consequences
is neither necessary nor sufficient for determining liability. Indeed, this
218. Id at 801-02.
219. See supra Subsections II.A.1-3.
220. See supra Section IIA.

221. 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(a) (2012).
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is the very conception of intent in tort law. 2 2 2
As a matter of statutory construction, federal courts have similarly
read the use of transitive verbs in statutes as calling for purposive action.
In Cole v. UnitedStates Attorney General,223 for example, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of a Jamaican
citizen's petition for asylum, 2 24 finding that his state criminal conviction
in South Carolina was a disqualifying "crime of violence" for deportation
purposes.2 2 5 Following the Supreme Court's instruction in Leocal v.
Ashcroft22 6 that a crime of violence requires a mens rea greater than mere
negligence, 2 27 the court in Cole found that the relevant South Carolina
statute making it "unlawful for a person to present or point at another
person a loaded or unloaded firearm" 22 8 suffices because the transitive
verb "presenting" refers to "'showing or displaying a firearm in a
threatening or menacing manner' and hence requires an intentional mens
rea."229

Similarly, in United States v. Hill,23 0 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of criminal charges of aiding and
abetting a gambling enterprise, finding that the so-called "illegal
gambling business" statute 2 3 1 may support felony accomplice liability if,
but only if, the aider and abettor demonstrates adequate intent.2 32
Following its own instruction in United States v. Bryant233 that aiding and
abetting as a general matter requires specific criminal intent,2 34 the court
in Hill found an appropriate intent requirement in the statute's "six
transitive verbs-'conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or
owns'"-denoting the actions that the accomplice's own actions must
have endorsed to be liable.2 3 5

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 520.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining a "crime of violence").
543 U.S. 1 (2004).
Id. at 9-11.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-410 (2015) (emphasis added).
712 F.3d at 528 (quoting In re Spencer R., 692 S.E.2d 569, 572 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010)).

More precisely, Cole accepted the South Carolina appellate court's interpretation of the statute
because the Eleventh Circuit independently found that "this interpretation of the active verb is
consistent" with more general state supreme court precedent about the elements of the state
statute. Id.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

55 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1995).
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2012).
Hill, 55 F.3d at 1198-99.
461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 920.
55 F.3d at 1202 (parsing the text of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1955).
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The Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroav. United States 2 3 6 elaborated
on this thread of statutory construction, taking it as implicit that a
transitive verb in statutory text calls for purposive action and finding
further that an adverb of intentionality that modifies such a verb also
modifies both the object of the verb and limitations on the object. 2 3 7 The
defendant had been convicted under the federal aggravated identity theft
statute, which holds liable anyone who "knowingly transfers, possesses,
or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another
person." 2 38 However, the Government had not proven or found it
necessary to prove the defendant's knowledge that the means of
identification belonged to another person. 2 3 9 Eight members of the Court,
including Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas concurring in
pertinent part, reversed the conviction and agreed that the statute's mens
rea requirement extended not only to the purposive actions denoted by
the transitive verbs ("transfers," "possesses," and "uses"), but also to the
object of those verbs ("means of identification") and to the modifier of
that object ("of another person").24 0 Justice Alito, for his part, limited his
concurrence only to reject an inflexible rule of construction whereby the
mens rea requirements of federal criminal statutes might routinely apply
to every element of an offense. 2 4 1
It seems uncontroversial as a general matter of construction, therefore,
that the use of transitive verbs in the direct patent infringement statute
calls for purposive action on the part of the alleged infringer and that the
requisite level of purpose be at the minimal standard of tortious intent: to
seek to accomplish a making, an offering, a selling, or a using.
2. The Common Law Basis for Tortious Intent
The widespread acceptance of direct infringement as a strict liability
offense is problematic because the strict liability designation originally
arose as an inference from what direct infringement does not requireintent to infringe, knowledge of the patent, and so on-but the
designation has since become a starting premise for the infringement
determination itself.2 4 2 Yet strict liability is itself an incomplete inference
and therefore an inapt premise, as it ignores an important element of
determining direct patent infringement: whether there is an intent to
236. 556 U.S. 646 (2009).
237. Id at 650-52.
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added).
239. Flores-Figueroa,556 U.S. at 648.
240. See id at 650-54; id at 657 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment).
241. Id at 659 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
242. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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perform the act that constitutes infringement.
The basis for inquiring into an alleged infringer's intent to perform
such actions already exists implicitly in the direct infringement
jurisprudence, in cases dating as far back as the early twentieth century.
In Brothers v. UnitedStates,243 for example, the plaintiff asserted a patent
on improvements in cableways on gravity anchors whereby the towers
connecting the cables would desirably yield or tilt. 2"4 During construction
of the Panama Canal, the U.S. government had built rigid cableway
towers that happened to yield or tilt under the stress of tightened cables,
and the patentee argued that this was infringement. 2 45 The U.S. Court of
Claims found noninfringement, however, because the government's
towers were rigid by design, and unintended mechanical behavior in the
towers that happened to coincide with the patented invention was not
infringement. 2 4 6
Likewise, in Prattv. UnitedStates,2 47 the plaintiff asserted a patent on
a mechanism for hooking an airplane in flight to a stationary arresting
apparatus and thereby gradually slowing the airplane's speed to land it in
very short distance. 24 8 The U.S. government employed a mechanism on
its naval aircraft carriers designed for hooking an airplane that had
already landed on the deck and thereby slowing only its forward progress,
though at times the government's mechanism did happen to hook an
airplane while the airplane was still technically in flight; on this basis, the
patentee argued infringement. 2 4 9 The Court of Claims again found
noninfringement, holding that if a device was constructed and intended
to operate on a different principle than what the patent involved and
intended, then inadvertent or unskillful operation that happened to
coincide with the patented invention was not infringement. 25 0 In both
cases, the court found direct noninfringement, not because the defendant
was unaware of the patent or because it did not intend to infringe, but
because it did not intend to perform the underlying actions that
constituted infringement.
This basis for direct noninfringement has survived into modem
Federal Circuit jurisprudence as well. In Pall Corp. v. Hemasure,2 5 1 for
example, plaintiff Pall Corporation asserted a patent on a venting system

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

52 Ct. Cl. 462 (1917).
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id.
43 F. Supp. 461 (Ct. Cl. 1942).
Id. at 461, 475.
Id. at 475-76.
Id.
181 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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for filtering leukocytes from blood using porous membranes to prevent
the passage of air into a filtration chamber. 2 5 2 Defendant Hemasure's
filtration system contained similar porous membranes, but Hemasure did
not intend these membranes to filter air from blood.2 53 Accordingly, the
court held that the divergent purpose of the membrane precluded liability
for direct infringement even if the accused system appeared literally to
infringe. 2 5 4 Conversely, in Centillion Data Systems v. Qwest
Communications,2 5 5 plaintiff Centillion asserted a patent on a system for
a service provider to gather, process, and deliver information to a
customer. 2 56 Defendant Qwest argued that there was no directly
infringing "use" of the patented system by accepting customer queries
and performing the back-end processing itself, rather than allowing
customers to use the entire system autonomously. 2 5 7 The court, however,
found direct infringement, reasoning that a customer's engagement of the
system by creating a query causes the remainder of the system to "act for
its intended purpose" and therefore is enough to create a directly
infringing use. 258 In these modem cases, too, the finding of direct.
infringement (or not) has turned on whether the alleged infringer's
conduct, whether by designing toward or away from a particular purpose,
259
reflected an intent to perform the actions that constitute infringement.
Importantly, the findings in these cases concerning what the patented
inventions were actually designed to accomplish are examples of
purposive construction in evaluating the scope of patent rights. This
approach to construction is altogether appropriate, for just as the tortious
intent refers to that purposive action of the alleged infringer that violates
the patent, purposive construction of the patent itself refers to what
invention the inventor intended for the patent to protect.2 6 0
Despite this implicit role for tortious intent in direct patent
infringement-quite apart from knowledge of a patent or intent to
infringe it-courts and commentators alike have mistakenly persisted in
describing direct patent infringement as a strict liability offense. 2 6 1 The
252. Id at 1307-08.
253. Id at 1310-11.
254. Id at 1312.
255. 631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
256. Id at 1281.
257. Id at 1284-85.
258. Id at 1285.
259. See, e.g., MLMC, Ltd. v. Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 464, 475 (D. Del.
2002) (discussing the act of intentionally designing away from another patent as evidence of noninfringement).
260. See infra Subsection III.E.2.

261. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Potter Voice
Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 882, 885 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting In re Seagate, 497
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mistaken strict liability conception, in turn, has had important
consequences for the role of indeterminacy and notice in the patent
system.
III. TOWARD A NEW VIEW OF DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
The focus of Part II has been to fill the doctrinal gap identified in Part
I regarding direct patent infringement by defining a doctrine of tortious
intent that connects purposive action to tort liability, particularly in the
unresolved controversy over divided infringement. Part III now places
the doctrine of tortious intent in context with larger open questions about
patent infringement and identifies several important benefits that this
doctrine offers in the ongoing patent policy debate.
A. Direct Infringement as an IntentionalTort
The mistaken view that direct patent infringement is a strict liability
tort and the identification of a precisely defined inquiry into the purposive
actions of the alleged infringer point to a straightforward-though
perhaps dissonant-conclusion. The basic act of infringing a patent is
best understood as an intentional tort.
It has been necessary to refer separately to an underlying tortious
intent because patent law separately imposes penalties for infringement
that stems from knowledge or reckless ignorance 2 62 of legal rights or an
intent to infringe, whether through willful infringement 2 63 or through
induced or contributory infringement.2 6 Where these particular forms of
knowledge or intent are unnecessary, patent law has declared strict
liability. 265 Yet the definition of intent in the tort law sense is modest
enough to fit even what little space remains for purposive action when all
other requirements of willfulness, recklessness, or knowledge are gone.
In direct patent infringement, as in the rest of tort law, intent denotes only
"that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." 266
F.3d 1360); Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 487, 510 (M.D.
Pa. 2010).
262. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing the willful infringement
standard, which previously required actual knowledge or notice of the patent as articulated by
UnderwaterDevices); supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing the current Seagate
standard, which permits a finding of willfulness based on recklessness on the part of the infringer).
263. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing the role of knowledge and
intent in willful infringement).
264. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing the role of knowledge and
intent in induced infringement and contributory infringement).
265. See supra Subsection I.A.1 (discussing what was historically meant by a "strict
liability" view of patent infringement).
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

89 and accompanying text.

§

8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see supra notes 182-
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This elementary and overlooked view of intent offers theoretical
support for at least four important doctrinal entry points into the debate
over boundary notice in the patent system. A first entry point is the need
to differentiate among makers, sellers, and users of inventions that turn
out to be patented. This is an economically significant distinction to make
when evaluating and allocating the costs and risks associated with
avoiding infringement, but it is a distinction for which patent law
currently offers no principled approach. A second entry point is the recent
jurisprudential shift in the doctrine of inherency away from traditional
requirements of recognition of the conduct in question, with regard to
prior art anticipation as well as to infringement. A third entry point is the
challenge of divided infringement, which the Supreme Court confronted
but left ultimately unresolved in its October 2014 Term. A fourth entry
point is the proper approach to ex post claim construction by courts once
a patent owner has asserted its rights against alleged infringers,
particularly those whose conduct may reside in a zone of uncertainty that
is outside the scope of the patented invention but inside the scope of the
patent claim language.
B. Makers vs. Sellers vs. Users
In some respects, treating direct infringement as an intentional tort
makes little immediate difference; in other respects, considerable
difference. And that difference is precisely the point.
1. Intent to Make an Invention
For technology implementers acting in a variety of economic
circumstances, the act of making an invention is already purposive.
Among simple articles of manufacture, for example, where a patent
covers a chair comprising four legs, a seat, and a back, it is unlikely that
a manufacturer of stools that comprise four legs and a seat will possess
the tortious intent to infringe the patent. To do so, the manufacturer would
have to set out to build a stool and unintentionally build a chair. To be
sure, more complicated facts abound, particularly in industries that
operate at microscale and nanoscale. Such manufacturing operations
may, indeed, run afoul of patents either despite designs to the contrary or
simply from ignorance. Recent case law addressing such truly inadvertent
infringement is discussed in detail later in this Article. 2 6 7 In the main,
however, the deliberate design, antecedent detail, and often high fixed
cost of establishing manufacturing operations suggest that an entity will
usually have the tortious intent to make an invention that does, or does
not, infringe a patent. The doctrine of tortious intent does little to disrupt
this state of affairs.
267. See infra Subsection I1I.C.3.
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2. Intent to Sell an Invention
Sales and offers for sale are a less straightforward case. The work of
sellers, like that of manufacturers, is undoubtedly purposive at the basic
level of intending to sell something. Depending on the complexity of the
good or service being sold, however, there may or may not be tortious
intent with specific regard to a particular patented invention. For
example, the stool manufacturer's distributor surely knows that the goods
she is selling are stools rather than chairs. Yet a smartphone
manufacturer's distributor may well be unaware that the goods she is
selling include chipsets that are based on a reduced instruction set
computing (RISC) architecture. 2 6 8 If So, she would lack the tortious intent
to sell such a chipset and would not be liable for infringing a patent that
covered such chipsets. Notably, an upstream component vendor that sold
chipsets to the smartphone manufacturer likely would not be so ignorant
in this regard. Hence, the manufacturer would likely possess the tortious
intent to sell and be liable for infringement, all else equal. This practical
importance of an actor's position in the stream of commerce is a sensible
result of the doctrine of tortious intent because it tends to create liability
among those actors who are well positioned at lowest cost to avoid
infringement 269 and tends to alleviate the risk of liability among those
actors who are not so well positioned or for whom the cost of informing
themselves of technical details are impractically higher in light of their
downstream commercial and nontechnical roles as, for example,
distributors or retailers.
3. Intent to Use an Invention
Using is the case for which the doctrine of tortious intent offers the
most powerful flexibility as a doctrinal lever. In part this is because what
constitutes use in patent law is multiform. One important set of users for
268. Rachel Courtland, The Battle Between ARM and Intel Gets Real, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr.
25, 2012, 16:09 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/processors/the-battle-betweenarm-and-intel-gets-real.

269. This conclusion rests upon a large body of law and economics literature regarding the
allocation of risk and cost to those whose activities give rise to relevant accidents and harms

"[o]nly if it can clearly be shown that injurers could have cheaply avoided the loss." See Guido
Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REv. 519, 519 (1978). To put the
principle more formally, "economic efficiency asks for that combination of entitlements to engage
in risky activities and to be free from harm from risky activities which will most likely lead to the
lowest sum ofaccident costs and of costs of avoiding accidents." Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85

HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1972) (emphasis added). Importantly, this least-cost-avoidance
principle does not systematically foreordain liability for any one class of parties, whether it be the
injurer or the injured, for "[a]s often as not, the best decision maker is the victim." Guido
Calabresi, Civil Recourse Theory's Reductionism, 88 IND. L.J. 449, 456 (2013).

2016]1

AN INTENTIONAL 70RTTHEORYOFPA TENTS

613

whom tortious intent is a particularly timely doctrinal innovation is end
users. End users, who may be broadly understood as the eventual and
ultimate consumers of an integrated technology, have been exposed to
patent infringement liability at various points in U.S. history. One
example is the assertion of dormant agricultural patents against farmers
during Reconstruction.270 Another example is the threat by patent lawyer
George Selden, who held a broad patent on automobiles generally,
against would-be customers of the Ford Motor Company that to purchase
a Model T was to "[b]uy a [1]awsuit." 2 7 1 End users remain equally
important in the current debate over patent litigation and patent notice,
particularly in cases where patent owners assert their rights against
allegedly infringing manufacturers (who are accused of making the
patented invention), against allegedly infringing distributors and retailers
(who are accused of selling the patented invention), and finally against
customers at the end of the stream of commerce (who are accused of using
the patented invention).27 2
Among the variety of proposals aimed at empowering end users in the
face of such patent assertions, two of note include targeted fee shifting
for prevailing end users 2 73 and an explicit customer-suit exception. 2 74 Fee
shifting is a pragmatic departure from the usual American Rule requiring
each party to pay its own way. 275 Alternatively, the current customer-suit
exception, a procedural case management mechanism, is a relatively
obscure common law practice of staying end user litigation until the
courts have resolved upstream lawsuits against the accused
manufacturer. 2 7 6
By comparison, the doctrine of tortious intent offers a direct
substantive reply to such end user litigation practices, whatever their
270. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2007).
271. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,

90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 888-90, 890 n.217 (1990).
272. Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443,
1443-44 (2014) (discussing threatened and actual litigation by patent assertion entities against
end users). Professor Gaia Bernstein argues that patent owners in such cases have no need to
cultivate relationships with customers and so are not deterred from asserting their rights in ways
that practicing patent owners would be. Id at 1455-56. This, together with a large pool ofpotential

alleged infringers and a high likelihood of settling rather than exploring the merits of a litigation
at great cost, has led to a proliferation of economically inefficient end user litigation. Id at 1447,
1470 & n.175.
273. Id. at 1450.
274. Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding PatentLaw's Customer Suit Exception, 93

B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1614 (2013).
275. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person'sAccess to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1575-76 (1993).

276. See, e.g., Rates Tech. Inc. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., No. 94 Civ. 9297 (DC), 1995 WL 438954,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1995).
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prevalence or severity may be as an empirical matter. Whereas
manufacturers by virtue of their direct purposive engagement with the
making of technologies are likely to possess the tortious intent to make,
and whereas sellers may or may not possess the tortious intent to sell
depending on their position in the stream of commerce, end users are
more unlikely than any other economic actors to possess the tortious
intent to use the kinds of highly integrated inventions that pose the
greatest problems of notice. Accordingly, end users' lack of tortious
intent in such cases would substantively shield them from liability for the
intentional tort of direct patent infringement.
C. Inherency and the Anticipation-InfringementSymmetry
Second, with respect to inherency, the doctrine of tortious intent
provides a potential resolution for the Federal Circuit's controversial
emerging jurisprudence in the doctrines of both anticipation and
infringement.
1. The Anticipation Doctrine
Anticipation is a legal conclusion that a given invention is not novel
because the invention was previously patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use.2 77 Regardless of the source of anticipation,
the features of the invention as presently claimed must all be present in a
single source-the "all elements rule"-for novelty to be destroyed. 27 8 If
the elements of the invention are dispersed over two or more prior
sources, then the nonobviousness requirement is the appropriate standard
for evaluating whether the invention is patentable. 2 7 9 The all elements
rule also governs infringement such that an accused device must contain
every limitation of an asserted patent claim, either literally or
equivalently, to infringe the claim. 2 8 0 As this shared use of the all
elements rule reflects, U.S. patent law has long recognized a symmetry
between anticipation and infringement. 2 8 1 The usual articulation of this
symmetry is "[tihat which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if

277. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
278. Net MoneylN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
279. See 35 U.S.C. § 103; Alfredo De La Rosa, A Hard Pillto Swallow: Does Schering v.
Geneva Endanger Innovation Within the PharmaceuticalIndustry?, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.

REv. 37, 44 (2007).
280. TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
281. Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(finding it "well established for over a century that the same test must be used for both
infringement and anticipation").
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earlier." 282
2. The Inherency Doctrine
Yet the all elements rule is not the end of the story. To it, the courts
have added the common law principle of inherency, which holds that
although some necessary element may not expressly be identified, the law
may still consider the element to be present if it is inherent in the given
technology. 2 83 For example in Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,284 the Federal Circuit found inherent anticipation
and so invalidated a patent on an anhydrate crystal formulation of a drug
for treating hypertension and benign prostatic hyperplasia. 2 8 5 A third
party not involved in the litigation had previously sold the compound in
the United States, and although none of the parties to those transactions
had known which particular anhydrate crystal they were transacting at the
time, the court found that the product sold had inherently possessed each
of the limitations of the asserted patent claim.2 8 6 Accordingly, the sales
anticipated the patented invention, and the asserted claim was invalid.28 7
Importantly, the doctrine of inherency traditionally included a
requirement that an inherent element could contribute to anticipation only
if people of ordinary skill in the art know or appreciate the inherent
2 8 9 the Supreme Court
element.2 8 8 For example in Tilghman v. Proctor,
upheld a patent on a process for separating natural fats into fatty acids
and glycerine by applying high temperature and high heat to a mixture of
natural fats and water. 2 9 0 An earlier steam cylinder had been in use that
happened to subject tallow, which was used to lubricate the piston, to a
similar combination of high temperature and high heat and thus produced
some quantities of fatty acids and glycerine as incidental waste
products. 2 91 The Court declined to find inherency, explaining that the
282. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 21 F. 319, 321 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1884), affd, 129 U.S. 530,
537 (1889).
283. See Cont'1 Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268-69 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (discussing the weight given to the inherency doctrine when determining anticipation under

35 U.S.C. § 102).
284. 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
285. Id. at 1316, 1319.
286. Id at 1317, 1319.

287. Id. at 1319.
288. Cont'l Can, 948 F.2d at 1268 (requiring that the inherent element "would be so
recognized by persons of ordinary skill"). As to what is actually inherent, rather than what is
merely probabilistic, the doctrine also requires that "the missing descriptive matter is necessarily
present in the thing described in the reference." Id.

289. 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
290. Id at 709, 734.
291. Id at 710-11.
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prior accidental effects that coincided with the patent claims were "never
fully understood" and occurred "accidentally and unwittingly ... without
exciting attention." 29 2 Accordingly, the Court concluded that a finding of
anticipation would be "absurd." 293
Similarly, in Eibel ProcessCo. v. Minnesota & OntarioPaperCo.,294
the Supreme Court upheld a patent on an improvement to the field of
Fourdrinier paper-making machines. 2 9 5 Prior to the patented invention,
such machines began to produce defective paper when the rolling woven
mesh belt on which the paper was formed moved faster than 500 feet per
minute. 2 96 Inventor William Eibel determined that the reason for this
defect was that the mesh belt, known as the wire, was moving more
quickly than the raw paper stock, leading to turbulence and rippling in
the stock itself. 29 7 Eibel solved this problem by sharply raising the slope
of the wire and thus increasing the downward speed of the stock by the
additional gravitational force so that the wire and stock would move at
roughly equal speeds, allowing for better paper and faster production
speeds. 2 9 8 The validity of the patent was challenged based on an earlier
patent to inventors Barrett and Home whose invention had similarly
raised the slope of the wire for water drainage-related purposes, and so
the challenger argued accordingly that the earlier patent anticipated
Eibel's patent regardless of "whether Barrett and Home perceived the
advantage of speeding up the stock to an equality with the wire, yet the
necessary effect of their devices was to achieve that result." 2 9 9 The Court,
citing Tilghman, reiterated the knowledge requirement for inherency that
"accidental results, not intended and not appreciated, do not constitute

anticipation."300
3. The Role of Tortious Intent
These historical affirmations-that knowledge, recognition, or
appreciation of a putatively inherent element in the prior art are necessary
to create anticipation and destroy novelty-have also been a doctrinal
bulwark against creating liability for truly inadvertent infringement based
on a theory of inherency. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex

292. Id. at 711-12.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 712.
261 U.S. 45 (1923).
Id. at 46, 69.
Id at 52.
Id.
Id at 52, 55.
Id. at 66.
Id
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Corp.,301 however, the Federal Circuit dramatically enlarged the scope of
inherent anticipation. 3 0 2 As a result, the Federal Circuit's decision has
created the symmetric potential for inherent infringement as well.
The SmithKline decision invalidated SmithKline's patent on
crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride (PHC) hemihydrate, one of a class
of chemical compounds invented during the late 1970s and possessing
antidepressant properties.303 An earlier form of the paroxetine salt had
been an anhydrate lacking any bound water molecules, whereas the more
stable hemihydrate comprised PHC crystals with one water molecule for
every two PHC molecules. 304 The court held that the prior art anhydrate
inherently anticipated the patented hemihydrate because producing the
anhydrate necessarily produced trace amounts of hemihydrate. 3 0 5 The
court found it irrelevant that these trace amounts were not detectable at
the time3 06 and were therefore incapable of being appreciated by those of
ordinary skill in the art. Not coincidentally, the court in SmithKline also
found that Apotex, by producing such trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate
through its production of prior art PHC anhydrate, would have infringed,
SmithKline's patent. 3 07 However, in view of the court's inherent
anticipation finding, the finding of infringement carried no liability.3 0 8
The SmithKline decision has potentially profound ramifications for,
the patent notice debate. By removing the inherency doctrine's historical
sine qua non of knowledge, recognition, or appreciation, the Federal
Circuit has bilaterally distorted the incentive structure underlying the
patent system. On the one hand, because qualities inherent in a
technology that were unappreciated even by those having ordinary skill
in that technology may now create anticipation and defeat novelty, the
ability of innovators to secure patent protection is weaker. 3 0 9 No less
important, however, is the implicit newfound ability of patent owners to
impose infringement liability on a theory of inherent infringement against
301. 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
302. Id. at 1329 (granting petitions for rehearing en banc only for the limited purpose of
vacating the original opinion on the issue of experimental use). The dissent expressed concern
"that the court has preserved the [panel] opinion's enlargement of the ground of invalidity called
'inherent anticipation."' Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).

303. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir.), aff'd
en banc, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id
Id. at 1341-42.
Id.
Id at 1346.
Id at 1346-47.

309. See, e.g., De La Rosa, supra note 279, at 40-42, 48 (arguing that the broader scope of
the inherent anticipation doctrine in SmithKline stands to impede the development by
pharmaceutical companies of in vivo metabolites and other biological compositions).
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those whose conduct inadvertently constitutes practicing the patented
invention. This is strict liability patent infringement in the true sense, and
because no appreciation of the physical consequences of one's conduct is
necessary for a finding of inherent infringement, the boundary notice
function of patents and the opportunity to avoid infringement in this
regime are wholly meaningless.
The doctrine of tortious intent provides a cure for this jurisprudential
shift as well. Because tortious intent requires purposive action on the part
of an alleged infringer3 10 and because purposive action is not possible
without knowledge or appreciation of the underlying consequences of
one's actions, 3 11 the intentional nature of the direct infringement tort
proposed here provides a natural check against such an unconstrained
view of inherency, either for anticipation or for direct infringement.3 12
D. Divided Infringement
Third, on the issue of divided infringement, recent guidance from the
Supreme Court has created the need for a coherent theoretical basis for
ascribing intent to alleged infringers.
1. Akamai and the Single-Entity Rule
Before the Federal Circuit reheard Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai
Technologies, Inc., 313 the Court rejected the doctrine that that an alleged
infringer who performs only some of the steps of a patented method while
encouraging another to perform the remaining steps may be liable for
induced infringement even if no one was liable for an underlying direct
infringement.3 14 The Federal Circuit had originally held en banc that such
inducement liability could attach because inducement does not require
that the underlying direct infringement create liability, only that direct
infringement occurred: to satisfy this limited latter condition, it is enough

310. See supra Section II.B (elucidating the operation of the doctrine of relevant intent in

patent infringement).
311. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (discussing the long-understood
relationship between appreciation of the physical consequences of one's conduct and purposive

action in the sense of intent).
312. But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 381-

82 (2005) (advancing a "public benefit" theory of inherency that foundationally rejects the
knowledge or appreciation requirement in traditional inherency doctrine and, accordingly,
commends the Federal Circuit's turn in SmithKline). Professors Burk and Lemley follow their
argument as to anticipation to its conclusion in infringement, acknowledging that direct patent

infringement will, indeed, be a true strict liability offense. Id. at 401 n. 150.
313. 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014), remandedfor reh'g en banc, 797 F.3d 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc).

314. Id. at 2115.
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that the related parties perform all the steps of the patented method."'
Though the en banc Federal Circuit did not originally address direct
infringement liability where the infringement is divided among different
actors acting at arm's length,3 6 two dissents from that opinion argued
that the issue cannot be avoided because direct and induced infringement
are not separable in the way that the majority proposed.3 17 Following the
Supreme Court's reversal, the Federal Circuit reheard the divided direct
infringement issue and expanded its direct infringement ruling. 3 18
2. The Role of Tortious Intent
The policy concern of the en banc Federal Circuit majority reflects the
potentially significant impact of divided infringement upon the role of
purposive action in direct patent infringement. The majority sought to
abrogate the single-entity rule 3 19 because where multiple actors at arm's
length "share performance" of the steps in a patented method, "the
patentee has no remedy, even though the patentee's rights are plainly
being violated by the actors' joint conduct." 320 With divided infringement
now necessarily a question of direct infringement, however, true strict
liability that disregards any intent whatsoever cannot furnish the
purposive action necessary to "share" performance or to produce "joint"

315. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
316. The en banc question in Akamai was whether the direct infringement doctrine should
preserve the so-called "single-entity rule" whereby all steps in a patented method must be
performed by, or attributable to, a single entity for liability to arise. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v.

Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App'x 989, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
317. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1319 (Newman, J., dissenting); id at 1337-38 (Linn, J.,

dissenting).
318. See Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2117 ("Assuming without deciding that the Federal Circuit's
holding in Muniauction [that the single-entity requirement for direct infringement is appropriate]
is correct."); id at 2120 (observing pointedly that "on remand, the Federal Circuit will have the
opportunity to revisit the § 271(a) question [that direct infringement requires a single entity] if it

so chooses"). On rehearing, the Federal Circuit held that "Section 271(a) is not limited solely to
principal-agent relationships, contractual arrangements, and joint enterprise, as the vacated panel
decision held. Rather, to determine direct infringement, we consider whether all method steps can
be attributed to a single entity." Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020,

1023 (2015).
319. Though the Supreme Court identified the single-entity rule with the decision in
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2008), Muniauction had
built on the earlier holding in BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-82

(Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). The en banc Federal Circuit

majority in Akamai wrote to address the conflict in past rulings on the single-entity rule of both
Muniauction and BMC. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1318-19 (majority opinion) (overruling BMC).

320. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1305-06.
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conduct in a meaningful sense. 3 2 1
Put another way, any theory of direct infringement that purports to
account for divided infringement must show that legally distinct actors
have, indeed, acted with some minimal cooperative purpose so that the
law has a principled reason for treating their various partially infringing
activities as a collective whole. The actors need not have any joint or
individual intent to infringe a patent, nor even any joint or individual
knowledge that such a patent exists-but to be cooperative, their actions
must proceed from a purpose to accomplish a mutually known and
intended result. Without this minimal cooperative purpose as to the act
itself, any liability for divided direct infringement would necessarily
impose a joint penalty upon independent actors who need not have had
any notice of each other's conduct. In fact, the Federal Circuit rehearing
decision in Akamai proceeded along similar lines by defining divided
infringement not by reference to particularforms ofcooperation(such as
the "direction or control" test or the "joint enterprise" test) but rather by
reference to the fact of cooperation, i.e., whether all the steps were
attributable to a single entity.322
The following example illustrates the inappropriateness of imposing
direct infringement liability collectively on entities that are purposively
independent of each other.
*

Acme Corp. holds U.S. Patent '816, issued in 2003 and expiring in
2020, whose only claim is directed to a rolling chair assembly method
comprising:
o Step 1: securing a first terminal end of each of four legs onto a
first side of a first two-sided flat surface suitable for sitting;
o Step 2: securing a suitable wheel onto a second terminal end of
each said leg; and
o Step 3: securing a second two-sided flat surface orthogonally onto
a second side of said first two-sided flat surface.
* Since 2004, Betel, Inc. of South Carolina has produced floor seats
whose assembly practices only the third step of the '816 Patent.
* Since 2010, independent and ignorant of Betel, Cassco Ltd. of Oregon
has produced wheeled tables whose assembly practices only the first
two steps of the '816 Patent.
* As neither Betel nor Cassco has practiced every step of the patent
claim, neither entity alone is liable for direct infringement.3 2 3

321. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.

322. Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1022-23.
323. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980) (noting that
direct infringement requires practicing "every single element" of the claimed invention).
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Yet under a doctrine of divided direct infringement that requires no
minimal cooperative purpose or tortious intent common to both Betel
and Cassco, Acme could hold them jointly liable even though their
geographic and temporal separations reflect their purposive
independence from each other.

In short, a principled approach to the timely issue of divided patent
infringement requires a legal basis for evaluating the alleged infringers'
conduct collectively, and that legal basis must establish some minimal
cooperative purpose to achieve a mutually known and intended result.
The doctrine of tortious intent supplies this necessary purposive action
proceeding from well-understood tort principles. Importantly, the
doctrine of tortious intent does not impose any greater requirement,
leaving intact the settled patent law that direct infringement does not
require knowledge of a patent nor any intent to infringe it.
E. Claim Construction
Fourth, with respect to claim construction, the doctrine of tortious
intent provides a conceptual vehicle for courts to engage more
transparently in claim construction that is purposive rather than solely
linguistic. 324
1. Linguistic vs. Purposive Construction
The U.S. patent system operates in a peripheral claiming regime in
which claims describe the outer bounds of the invention rather than a
central claiming regime in which claims describe the core principles of
the invention. 325 Consistent with the broad remit of this approach to
claiming, patent rights are also defined primarily by reference to
necessary and sufficient characteristics rather than by reference to
exemplars from which the law must subsequently infer the appropriate
scope of attendant legal rights. 32 6 Given this focus on the patent claim as
being both denotative of the invention and synonymous with the scope of

324. For a comprehensive theoretical treatment of the distinction between determining the
linguistic meaning of claims (interpretation) and giving legal effect either to that interpreted
meaning or to some other normatively appropriate meaning (construction), see Tun-Jen Chiang
Distinctionin Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J.
& Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction

530, 546, 553 (2013).
325. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (distinguishing between peripheral claiming and central claiming); Burk & Lemley, supra
note 129, at 1744-46 (same).
326. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 732-34

(2009).
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exclusionary rights, 3 2 7 it is not surprising that construction of patent
claims is the essential step in evaluating infringement.3 2 8 As a practical
matter, claim construction is frequently outcome-determinative of
litigation itself.329 For all its importance, however, claim construction
remains a highly contentious practice, not merely between individual
litigants who maneuver for a strategically favorable reading of the claimsin-suit, but among courts and commentators who embrace divergent
theories of how generally to construe claims and how not to.
This theoretical debate has two major dimensions. One is procedural
and ultimately structural: the allocation of the authority to construe claims
with some measure of finality or deference. As the Court explained in
Markman, the legal conclusion of what claim terms mean has long been
a question of law for de novo appellate review. 3 3 0 The en banc Federal
Circuit in Cybor further interpreted Markman to mean that claim
construction is a pure question of law with no distinct subsidiary
questions of fact. 3 3 1 Recently, after more than fifteen years under Cybor,
the Federal Circuit, invoking stare decisis in LightingBallast, once again
affirmed claim construction to be a pure question of law. 3 3 2 The Supreme
Court recently decided the issue in Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc.3 3 3 Teva framed the issue as a conflict between a patent327. The succinct and oft-cited expression of this principle is Judge Giles Rich's maxim that
"the name of the game is the claim," i.e., that claims define what is patented and, necessarily, give
notice of what infringes and what does not. Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and
Interpretationof Claims-AmericanPerspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.

497, 499, 501 (1990).
328. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical,
and Normative Analysis ofPatent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2013).
329. See Kyle J. Fiet, Restoring the Promise of Markman: Interlocutory Patent Appeals

Reevaluated Post-Phillips v. AWH Corp., 84 N.C. L. REV. 1291, 1292-93 (2006); Daniel J.
&

Melman, Note, Post Markman: Claim Construction Trends in the Federal Circuit, RICH. J.L.
TECH. para. 2 (Spring 2001), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v7i4/note2.html; Stephanie Ann Yonker,
Post-PhillipsClaim Construction: Questions Unresolved, 47 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 301,

303 (2007).
330. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1995) (recalling that "[t]he
first [element of a patent case] is a question of law, to be determined by the court, construing the
letters-patent, and the description of the invention and specification of claim annexed to them"

(quotations omitted) (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853)).
331. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(finding that "[n]othing in the Supreme Court's opinion supports the view that the Court endorsed
a silent, third option-that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of

fact"), abrogatedby Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
332. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1283-85
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (addressing and rejecting various criticisms by reference to the
precedential value of Cybor and the potential tumult of reversing that decision), vacated and

remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
333. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
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exceptionalist Federal Circuit doctrine that requires de novo review of the
factual findings that a district court makes in support of its claim
construction and the general command of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a), which requires review of such factual findings for clear error. 3 3 4
The Court held that Rule 52(a) does apply to subsidiary facts in claim
construction-thus abrogating Lighting Ballast-and that appellate
review of such facts must be deferential.33 5
The question of appellate deference has important consequences for
certainty and stability, especially because the net effect between
horizontal and vertical certainty is not always clear a priori.33 6 These
arguments have special force in patent claim construction, 3 3 7 particularly
in light of the vigorous debate over certainty in boundary notice for the
patent system. 3 3 8 Nevertheless, the procedural allocation of the power to
construe is ultimately of second-order importance to the more immediate
challenge confronting judges.
That challenge is the substantive question of how to construe patent
claims. The Federal Circuit's authoritative articulation in Phillipsv. A WH
Corp.339 of the claim construction doctrine shed some light on the relative
importance of various analytical tools but left unstated any systematic
approach to the actual work of claim construction. 3 4 0 This work includes
evaluating intrinsic evidence of claim meaning such as the patent
specification, 3 4 1 prosecution history, 3 4 2 and the fate of related and foreign
applications, 3 4 3 as well as a panoply of extrinsic evidence such as

334. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2014 WL

230926 (2014) (No. 13-854) (stating the question presented).
335. 135 S. Ct. at 835. On remand, the Federal Circuit applied the corrected standard of
appellate review for the district court's claim construction-de novo review of the overall claim
construction and clear error review of the facts underlying the claim construction-and reached
the same outcome. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
336. Compare Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 585 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (anticipating greater predictability through de novo review in Equal Access
to Justice Act cases because courts of appeals would not be obligated to uphold divergent but
reasonable district court holdings), with Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010)
(anticipating greater predictability through deferential review in Employee Retirement Income
Security Act cases because employers could rely upon plan administrators rather than
"unexpected and inaccurate plan interpretations that might result from de novo judicial review").
337. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
338. See supra Section L.B.

339. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
340. See Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim
Construction: A Modern Synthesis and StructuredFramework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 718

(2010).
341. Id at 722-23.
342. Id at 723.
343. Id at 723-24.
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"inventor testimony, expert testimony, dictionaries, and documentary
evidence of how the patentee and alleged infringer have used the claim
terms." 344
The animating principle of the Phillips approach is fidelity to the
linguistic meaning of claim language, but such meaning is often not
enough to produce a complete analysis of the claims. 3 4 5 As a result, courts
must make normative judgments about how much legal effect, if any, to
give to the linguistic meaning of claims and, by comparison, how much
legal effect to give to some other point of reference, such as their
understanding of the inventive idea at the core of the patent.3 4 6 Indeed, a
number of scholars have advocated for a return to the inventive idea of
the patent as a way to manage perceived excesses both in the breadth of
patent scope and the breadth of patent assertion. The strongest of these
arguments is for an explicit and radical return to central claiming. 3 4 7 A
relatively milder argument is for a refocused view of peripheral claims as
useful proxies in identifying the invention rather than as necessary
synonyms of the invention itself.3 4 8 The interpretation-construction
distinction offers a way to clarify that the task of identifying the invention
is often a normative exercise beyond the linguistic meaning of claims. 3 4 9
To this line of argument, the doctrine of tortious intent contributes further
by enabling what is otherwise a desirably transparent but perhaps
"politically costly" choice by judges: construing purposively. 3 5 0
2. The Role of Tortious Intent
Purposive construction refers to deriving meaning from a document's
text based on the purposes for which the document was constituted,
whether the text is of a statute, a contract, or anything else.3 51 In the case
344. Id. at 725.
345. See Chiang & Solum, supra note 324, at 535-36.
346. Id. at 565-66.
347. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 129, at 1747 (describing their own proposal as a radical,
but useful, thought experiment and leaving open the question of whether the benefits of returning
to central claiming would outweigh the costs).
348. See Liivak, supra note 152, at 42-43. Professor Liivak's proposal is a single analytical

approach for navigating the embodiments disclosed in a patent. Id at 43-44. For a more
methodological argument that courts should choose from among various methodologies of
construing claims to reach socially optimal claim scope, see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent
Claim InterpretationMethodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms,47 WM. & MARY L. REV.

49, 128 (2005).
349. Chiang & Solum, supra note 324, at 566 (cautioning that "to the extent that a judge
chooses the linguistic meaning as his lodestar, the linguistic meaning may run out").
350. See id at 585 (referring to construing a patent to save its validity, which is a special
case of purposive construction).
351. See Nicholas Pumfrey et al., The Doctrine ofEquivalents in Various PatentRegimes-

Does Anybody Have It Right?, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 261, 287 (2009). For a concise history of
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of patents, purposive construction is the analysis of patent claims with a
view to what they exist to protect: the inventor's invention.3 5 2 In fact, the
controversy in Phillips was such a case.
Phillips was nominally about how to understand the term "steel
baffle" in the context of Edward Phillips's invention for a noise-, fire-,
and impact-resistant steel building material, which was particularly suited
for deflecting bullets. 3 53 Phillips was unable to prove infringement by
AWH Corporation under a claim construction where the patent failed to
cover steel baffles that did not deflect bullets due to their perpendicular
orientation to the adjoining wall faces; rather, the patent covered only
steel baffles that were oriented at an oblique or acute angle to deflect
bullets. 3 54 The en banc Federal Circuit divided over whether the linguistic
meaning of "steel baffles" in the '798 Patent was limited to those steel
baffles which deflect bullets. 3 5 5
There is force to Professors Tun-Jen Chiang and Lawrence Solum's
argument that the majority as well as the dissent in Phillips
unproductively focused on the linguistic meaning of the term "steel
baffles." 356 That term was neither ambiguous nor vague, though it may
have rendered the patent overly broad if the court had read the term in its
plain, linguistic meaning. 3 57 In fact, implicitly and opaquely, the Phillips
majority did just that, adopting a theory of construction that would give
effect to the linguistic meaning, whereas the dissent favored the purpose
of the invention rather than the linguistic meaning of the claims. 358 The
court would have done better to articulate transparently that its task was
to decide whether and to what extent to give legal effect to this linguistic
meaning. 3 5 9 Yet neither theory of construction is inherently preferable to
the other. Distinguishing claim interpretation from claim construction is
a highly useful exercise, but ultimately it is a descriptive one.
The doctrine of tortious intent, too, is amenable to either approach of
construction, though it does allow purposive construction to be more
purposive construction as a tool for construing written instruments and applying that history to
patent construction, see Catherine Ng, The Purpose of "Purposive Construction," 15 INTELL.

PROP. J. 1 (2000).
352. See Pumfrey et al., supra note 351, at 287.

353. Id. at 1310-11; U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798.
354. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane).
355. Id. at 1312-19.
356. Chiang & Solum, supra note 324, at 536 (describing the court's approach as "a fool's
errand" because the true dispute was over whether to give legal effect to the linguistic meaning of
"steel baffle" and thus "arguably extend the monopoly scope of the patent to something that the
patentee had not really invented").

357. Id.
358. Id at 569-70.
359. See id.
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transparent. 3 6 0 There is simply nothing in the record of the Phillips case
showing that AWH Corporation had no intention to build steel supports
containing steel baffles that were perpendicular to the adjoining wall
faces and as such could not deflect bullets. Thus, there was clearly
tortious intent to do something of interest. Whether that something
constitutes infringement depends on how the court ultimately construes
the claims. However, while conceptually agnostic, the doctrine of tortious
intent is particularly well-suited for purposive claim construction because
it mitigates the aversion that courts may have to making their normative
choices in claim construction explicit. 3 6 ' The Phillipsdissent, by focusing
on its own understanding of what Edward Phillips actually invented
rather than on the text of the '798 Patent, clearly and necessarily
disrespects the USPTO examination that produced the overbroad
patent.3 62 Rather than soften this conclusion through a linguistic
distortion of what the claim must mean, however, it is preferable to
engage expressly in a purposive construction that is more clearly justified
because the alleged infringer's tortious intent does not extend to making,
selling, or using what the patentee's invention actually is. As with the
interpretation-construction distinction, this is not to say that a purposive
approach is necessarily preferable, only that transparentpurposivism is
preferable and that the doctrine of tortious intent offers a way to be more
transparent.
In fact, a basis already exists in the case law for this link between
purposive claim construction and tortious intent. Both early and modem
examples of tortious intent, including the previously discussed Pratt3 6 3
and PallCorp.,364 are examples of purposive claim construction. In Pratt,
the infringement dispute was clear enough. The asserted patent covered
a mechanism that hooked an airplane in flight to a stationary arresting
apparatus and thus gradually retarded the airplane's vertical and forward
speed to land it in a very short distance. 3 65 The alleged infringing
mechanism on the government's naval aircraft carriers, by design,
hooked an airplane that had landed on the deck and thus retarded only its
forward progress. 3 6 6 To arrive at this technical, factually specific
distinction between the patented invention and the allegedly infringing
invention, however, the court construed the patent specifically with an
eye to naming its purpose and, incidentally, to preserving its validity:

360. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
361. See Chiang & Solum, supra note 324, at 585.
362. See id; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
363. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.

365. Pratt v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 461, 475 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
366. Id.
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In the instant case, it would not be a proper application of
the purpose of the patent laws to construe plaintiff's assumed
patent for a device to retard the speed of a plane while still
in flight so broadly as to prevent the development and use by
others of a device to stop the roll of a plane after it has
touched the landing surface. The two ideas are different.
Indeed, plaintiffs asserted novelty lay only in the
accomplishment of the former, since the latter was plainly
367
anticipated.
The court also made plain the connection between its purposive approach
to construction and the pragmatic importance of what the defendant did
and did not intend to do:
But because the whole problem arises out of the necessity
for landing planes on a surface of limited area, and because
the accomplishment of the feat is at best a hazardous one
involving great skill, the defendant, desiring to retard the
speed of the plane after it has touched the surface, should not
be compelled, in order to avoid infringement, to waste a
considerable amount of the limited landingarea by locating
its transverse cables so far forward on the deck that its planes
will never engage one of the cables until after they have
touched the landing surface. 3 6 8
Likewise, in PallCorp., the asserted patent covered a venting system
for filtering leukocytes from blood through porous membranes that
prevent the passage of air into a filtration chamber.3 6 9 Like the court in
Pratt, the court in PallCorp. bounded its construction of the patent by its
understanding of the purpose of the invention itself:
We deem the district court's claim construction to be unduly
broad. The '321 patent explains that the invention is directed
to facilitatingthe air-driven gravity flow of blood through
the leukocyte filter, reducing back pressure and minimizing
air contact with the blood after the filtration is complete. The
specification describes or suggests no role or location of the
"gas outlet comprising a porous medium" other than to
remove gas at the outlet of the system while retaining the
blood and barring reentry of air. We conclude that the correct
interpretation of claim clause [2] requires that the gas outlet
porous medium be placed so as to serve thatpurpose.3 7 0

367.
368.
369.
370.

Id at 476 (emphasis added).
Id (emphasis added).
Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1310 (emphasis added).
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These cases illustrate that the doctrine of tortious intent can valuably
clarify the practical consequences of construing patent claims
purposively, apart from the merits of purposivism itself.371 Indeed, the
tortious intent of the alleged infringer and a purposive understanding of
the patentee's claims are different sides of the same coin, for both reflect
what was intended to be accomplished with respect to the given
technology. This symmetry is, in fact, one that patent law has long
recognized, connecting the patentee's desire to design around the prior
art with the implementer's desire to design around the patent. 372
CONCLUSION

The central argument of this Article has been that direct patent
infringement is not a strict liability tort and that its designation is quite
harmful given the high stakes of notice failure that true strict liability
would implicate for the patent system. In place of this mistaken strict
liability view, the text of the Patent Act and the historical understanding
of patent infringement as an analogue of trespass in real property support
a reframing of direct patent infringement as an intentional tort. The
tortious intent of interest in this new doctrinal inquiry is an intent to
perform an act that constitutes infringement: making, selling, or using an
invention that happens to be patented. Neither a knowledge of patent nor
any intent to commit infringement is necessary, just as they have been
unnecessary for direct infringement thus far.
Moreover, the doctrine of tortious intent offers considerable practical
benefit for a number of doctrinal debates currently ongoing in the patent
system. First, it offers a conceptual basis for resolving the Supreme
Court's incomplete recent Limelight decision regarding divided patent
infringement.3 7 3 Second, it is consonant with the interpretation371. Related to the merits of construing patent claims purposively (i.e., based on the
invention whose protection is the purpose of the patent) are the merits of construing patent claims
with an eye toward the litigation outcomes of that construction. Professors Robert Merges and

John Duffy argue, for example, that courts cannot help but interpret claims in the context of the
particular infringement determinations that they face. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY,
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 907-08 (3d ed. 2002). Professors Dan Burk
and Mark Lemley agree, and even suggest that this may be a strategically appropriate outcome in
the adversarial civil litigation system. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent
Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 29, 50 (2005) (noting that "a judge's decision will

effectively take the infringement decision away from the jury altogether in most cases by selecting
a claim interpretation so constrained that it leaves no room for more than a single outcome" and
arguing that "if a judge's construction doesn't have this effect, it likely means the patent lawyers
on one side or the other haven't done their job").
372. Cf Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,

(2000) (highlighting the coordination that occurs between the designers and the artists).
373. See supra Subsection III.B.l.
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construction distinction in analyzing patent claims and offers a normative
justification for engaging transparently in purposive claim construction
as part of the growing scholarly emphasis toward decoupling the
invention from the peripheral claim. Third, it offers a jurisprudential cure
both to the Federal Circuit's ill-advised expansion in the SmithKline
decision of inherent anticipation doctrine and to that expansion's as-yetunrealized corollary, inherent infringement and its true strict liability
consequences. 3 7 4
Fourth, and most generally, the doctrine of tortious intent provides an
explicit policy lever for mitigating the naturally divergent effects of
patent boundary notice upon different economic actors depending on
their place and function in the technological marketplace. The doctrine
does so by exploiting the logical relationship between the specificity with
which various economic actors engage with technology and the
awareness, hence the purposive action, that the law may properly ascribe
to those actors in possessing the tortious intent to perform the actions that
may constitute infringement. Thus, manufacturers, who are likely to be
most directly engaged, will tend most likely to act with tortious intent,
and the doctrine will disrupt little in the current state of affairs. Sellers,
who are likely to be engaged with greater variation depending on their
place in the stream of commerce, will tend to act with tortious intent in
proportion to their engagement with the technical details of the goods that
they sell, and thus in proportion to their economically practicable ability
to avoid infringement at low cost. And users, particularly end users who
are likely to be least directly engaged with the technical details of
inventions--especially highly integrated products comprising large
numbers of component inventions-will tend least likely to act with
tortious intent and will be most likely exempt from infringement liability.
In this way, the doctrine of tortious intent also provides a systematic
underpinning for various existing proposals to provide such a
discriminant function within infringement doctrine, proposals that have
thus far remained pragmatic departures from the general body of patent
law.

374. See supra notes 302-12 and accompanying text.

